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The availability of data related to the employment relationship 
has ballooned into an unruly mass of personal characteristics, 
performance metrics, biometric recordings, and creative output.
The law governing this collection of information has been 
awkwardly split between privacy regulations and intellectual 
property rights, with employees generally losing on both ends.
This Article rejects a binary approach that either carves out 
private spaces ineffectually or renders data into isolated pieces 
of ownership. Instead, the law should implement a hybrid 
system that provides workers with continuing input and control 
without blocking efforts at joint production. In addition, 
employers should have fiduciary responsibilities in managing 
employee data, and workers should have collective governance 
rights over the data’s collection and use.
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INTRODUCTION
The Enron Corpus is a collection of 1.6 million emails, calendar 
entries, and notes that were made publicly available in 2003 by the Federal 
Energy Resource Commission (FERC).1 Over 600,000 emails within the 
Corpus were sent or received by 158 Enron executives through their 
employer’s Microsoft Outlook database.2 FERC seized the database are part of 
its investigation of illegal Enron manipulation of the energy markets—one 
lesser-known slice of the company’s wide-ranging malfeasance. At the 
conclusion of the investigation, the Commission released the database to the 
public to substantiate its findings.3 In its original state, the Corpus was an 
1 Rebecca Bolin, Risky Mail: Concerns in Confidential Attorney-Client Email, 81 U.
CIN. L. REV. 601, 648 (2012).
2 Id.; see also Corinne Purtill, The Emails that Brought Down Enron Still Shape Our 
Daily Lives, QUARTZ.COM, Feb. 19, 2019, https://qz.com/work/1546565/the-emails-that-
brought-down-enron-still-shape-our-daily-lives/.
3 Nathan Heller, What the Enron E-Mails Say About Us, NEW YORKER, July 17, 2017, 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/07/24/what-the-enron-e-mails-say-about-
us.
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amorphous set of unwieldy and unusable data. However, an MIT researcher 
worked to collect, manage, and rerelease the data in a format that researchers 
found to be eminently usable.4 The dataset has since become fodder for over 
100 research projects and commercial applications in computer science.5 It
has been most influential, however, as a training ground for artificial 
intelligence. Using these emails as raw data for real conversations, AI 
systems from Apple’s Siri to Google’s “smart compose” feature developed 
their understanding of human speech based on this set of communications 
amongst Enron employees.6
The story of the Enron Corpus raises many concerns. It’s disturbing to 
hear that AI systems learned about human interaction by churning through 
frenzied missives from workers at a company whose operations were going 
up in smoke.7 Enron has become synonymous with scandal, subterfuge, and 
excess—and yet these emails and calendar posts are teaching our algorithms 
how to think. Enron executives were not representative of the populace as a 
whole, in myriad ways, and still their flawed culture was embedded in 
machine learning systems.8 The use of the Corpus represents another 
example of AI systems learning from flawed and biased examples to 
reproduce inequality.9
4 Purtill, supra note 2. 
5 Heller, supra note 3; Purtill, supra note 2. 
6 Jessica Leber, The Immortal Life of the Enron E-Mails, MIT TECH. REV. , July 2, 
2013, https://www.technologyreview.com/2013/07/02/177506/the-immortal-life-of-the-
enron-e-mails/. 
7 Purtill, supra note 2 (“While the emails offer compelling evidence of how people 
talk to each other, specifically, they offer evidence of how people who thrived at a 
morally compromised US corporation in the late 1990s and early 2000s talked to 
each other.”).
8 Amanda Levendowski, How Copyright Law Can Fix Artificial Intelligence's 
Implicit Bias Problem, 93 WASH. L. REV. 579, 611 (2018) (“If you think there might be 
significant biases embedded in emails sent among employees of Texas oil-and-gas 
company that collapsed under federal investigation for fraud stemming from 
systemic, institutionalized unethical culture, you would be right.”).
9 Ifeoma Ajunwa, The Paradox of Automation As Anti-Bias Intervention, 41 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1671, 1673 (2020) (discussing how algorithms may “serve to 
reproduce inequalities at scale”); Jeffrey Dastin, Amazon Scraps Secret AI Recruiting 
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The release of the Enron Corpus into the public domain also violated
these employees’ personal privacy. The original dump included the emails 
without any redactions, leaving in phone numbers, Social Security numbers, 
bank records, and other tools for identity theft.10 Personal details came 
abruptly to light, such as complaints from the CEO’s daughter about 
weddings and even a heretofore undiscovered office tryst.11 The dataset was 
redacted on several occasions to protect personal information, but even 
mundane emails inevitably exposed the authors to unexpected scrutiny.12
These discussions of job performance, workplace gossip, and day-to-day 
grumbles and tribulations—along with allegations of deeply unethical 
behavior—were inextricably intertwined with the employees who wrote them.
There is yet another, mostly neglected aspect of the Enron Corpus: 
our new frontier in the creation of value. The dataset has been used over and 
over again by researchers to develop incredibly rich advancements in 
artificial intelligence. Simply by going about their daily business within the 
company, Enron employees developed an interconnected web of interactions 
providing raw material for cutting-edge research. In theory, this type of data 
now can be found at thousands of companies that provide email, texting, 
Slack channels, G-Chat, Zoom meetings, and other instances of recorded 
human conversation. But this data is not publicly available. The Enron data is 
thus something of a unicorn—a set of real business interactions that were 
made available to all and do not have meaningful copyright, privacy, or trade 
secret protections that might entangle researchers in legal claims.13 The 
Tool that Showed Bias against Women, REUTERS (Oct. 10, 2018 6:04 P.M.) (discussion 
Amazon recruiting algorithm that preferred men named Jared who played lacrosse). 
10 Bolin, supra note 1, at 648.
11 Id.; Leber, supra note 6. 
12 Leber, supra note 6. 
13 Levendowski, supra note 8, at 610-11 (describing the Enron emails as akin to 
“orphan works” and noting that “the Enron emails are perceived as posing an 
infinitesimally low legal risk because, though some of the Enron emails are 
protectable under copyright law, the practical likelihood of former Enron employees 
suing for copyright infringement is exceedingly remote”); Leber, supra note 6 (“A 
research ecosystem still blooms around the corpus because there is nothing else like 
it in the public domain. If it didn’t exist, research into business e-mails could be done 
only by people with access to big corporate or government servers.”)
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former employees and their company have been completely cut off from any 
claims of ownership, confidentiality, or protection over their work.
The new ecosystem of Big Data and machine learning has 
transmogrified ordinary interactions into valuable fuel. Information is 
vacuumed off of individuals in the course of their daily lives and used to 
provide new products, better services, and tailored advertising—“surveillance 
capitalism.”14 To date, the legal and policy discussions around information 
privacy and data protection have largely focused on our roles as consumers 
and the conduct of our private lives.15 Data in and from employment—our 
worklife data—has been neglected.
We generally regulate worker data16 under two legal categories: 
privacy and intellectual property. Privacy laws are invoked to shield workers’ 
personal information in specific contexts, such as lockers, drug tests, genetic 
information, and credit scores. Intellectual property generally hands 
employment-related data over to the employer through legal mechanisms 
such as trade secrets or “work-for-hire.” This sharp divide between personal 
and employment-related information is meant to protect workers’ autonomy 
while enabling them to participate in team production. This divide is 
breaking down, however, as employers realize the value of personal 
information to the workplace, and workers find their identities wrapped up in 
their vocations. The SARS-Cov-2 pandemic has only exacerbated this collapse, 
as employers take employees’ temperatures, trace their contacts on and off 
14 SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM (2019).
15 Sam Adler-Bell & Michelle Miller, The Datafication of Employment, CENTURY 
FOUNDATION (Dec. 19, 2018), https://tcf.org/content/report/datafication-employment-
surveillance-capitalism-shaping-workers-futures-without-knowledge/?agreed=1 (“For 
consumers, the digital age presents a devil’s bargain . . . . But less well understood is 
the way data—its collection, aggregation, and use—is changing the balance of power 
in the workplace.”).
16 This Article uses “employee data,” “worker data,” and “worklife data” 
interchangeably. Additionally, I will sometimes use “employee” to include workers 
that may not be considered employees under certain legal definitions. Likewise, the 
term “employer” will similarly apply to firms that hire people to provide labor, even 
when that is outside of a particular legal framework. When the legal definition of 
“employee” or “employer” is relevant to the Article, I will note it.
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the job, and monitor those who are working from home.17 The divide cannot 
hold. Workers are finding themselves virtually enmeshed within their 
businesses—without control, ownership, or regulation.
In response to this increasingly fraught set of dynamics, advocates and 
academics have generally proposed a ratcheting-up of workplace privacy 
protections.18 This Article takes a broader view, looking at a spectrum of 
potential legal mechanisms that can protect, secure, and reengage employees 
in their relationship with their data. Rather than dwelling on the personal 
nature of specific data or the expectation of privacy within a location, the 
employee should be empowered with respect to her data across a variety of 
contexts. That empowerment is founded on concepts of privacy, intellectual 
property, and governance to strengthen the bonds between the worker and 
her data. This multidimensional approach is necessary to manage the myriad 
aspects of the employment relationship. Moreover, it is emblematic of the 
success enjoyed by workers who are in relative positions of power and can 
best exploit the legal regime to protect their interests.
In order to situate our understanding, Part I of the article reviews the 
use of data in the employment relationship. Companies have always collected
and analyzed information about their workers, but the types of data, methods 
of extraction, and analytics of use have dramatically changed over time. Part 
II surveys the existing legal regulation of employee data within the United 
States. Part III examines complications of individual employee data within 
the concept of the firm. In particular, I discuss the merging of the categories 
of personal data and business-related data, as well as the embeddedness of 
17 See, e.g., Matthew T. Bodie & Michael McMahon, Employee Testing, Tracing, and 
Disclosure as a Response to the Coronavirus Pandemic, 64 WASH U. J.L & POL’Y
(forthcoming 2021); Mohana Ravindranath, Coronavirus Opens Door to Company 
Surveillance of Workers, POLITICO (June 26, 2020, 4:30 a.m.), 
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/06/26/workplace-apps-tracking-coronavirus-
could-test-privacy-boundaries-340525.
18 See, e.g., Ifeoma Ajunwa, Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Limitless Worker 
Surveillance, 105 CAL. L. REV. 735, 772-76 (2017) (describing potential reforms in 
employee privacy protections); Sissi Cao, Amazon Unveils AI Worker Monitoring for 
Social Distancing, Worrying Privacy Advocates, OBSERVER (June 16, 2020, 12:11 
p.m.), https://observer.com/2020/06/amazon-artificial-intelligence-monitor-
warehouse-worker-social-distancing-coronavirus/. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3819897
THE LAW OF EMPLOYEE DATA: PRIVACY, PROPERTY, GOVERNANCE
7
employees within the economic firm. The Article then compares the data 
relationship that firms have with less empowered workers, such as platform 
drivers, with empowered workers—specifically, professional athletes. Finally,
in Part IV the Article proposes a new framework for regulating worker data:
outfitting employees with continuing privacy and property rights over their 
data; imposing fiduciary responsibilities on the employer as to this data; and 
providing workers with participation rights in the governance of their firms.
I. DATA IN EMPLOYMENT: PAST AND PRESENT
As a preliminary matter, I should note that this article takes a very 
expansive view of data in employment. It includes any information that 
concerns the employee or the work done by the employee. It is information 
generated by the employee. Sometimes that information is seen as distinctly
personal, as in the employee’s weight, temperature, or political leanings, but 
it is also information that the employee generates within the scope of 
employment, as in the calls that the salesperson makes to customers, the path 
of employee movements tracked by GPS, and gossip exchanged between 
coworkers.19 This expansive view is necessary to capture the breadth of 
interaction between employee and employer, and the overwhelming amount 
of data that is available to collect and use. The key distinction is that the data 
involves a particular person—an individual employee—but is not confined to
“personal” information.20
19 The data need not be generated intentionally; it can be a byproduct of their actions 
or words. See, e.g., Jefferson Graham & Laura Schulte, Wisconsin Workers Embedded 
with Microchips, USA TODAY Aug. 1, 2017, 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/talkingtech/2017/08/01/wisconsin-employees-
got-embedded-chips/529198001/.
20 The definitional questions around data protection likely deserve more 
interrogation, but by choosing a broad scope I hope to take a detour around them.
See, e.g., Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and A New 
Concept of Personally Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814 (2011).
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Collecting and using data about workers is endemic to the 
employment relationship throughout its history.21 The question has been the 
nature and scope of the information exchange. Frederick Taylor based his 
system of scientific management on direct observation of workers in the 
process of working.22 Taylor focused on the nuts and bolts of the actions 
undertaken, and he largely believed that workers were interchangeable parts.
It took the development of the field of personnel management to recognize 
the importance of the individual to the production process.23 But this change 
also meant an expansion of the relevant zone of information—an expansion
to include the worker’s personality and desires.24 Henry Ford, an early 
practitioner of personnel management, created a “Sociological Department” 
21 See, e.g., Ajunwa, Crawford & Schultz, supra note 18, at 737 (“Ubiquitous employer 
surveillance of workers has a long and rich history as a defining characteristic of 
workplace power dynamics, including the de facto abrogation of almost any 
substantive legal restraints on its use.”); Ethan S. Bernstein, Making Transparency 
Transparent: The Evolution of Observation in Management Theory, 11 ACAD. MGMT.
ANNALS 217, 218 (2016) (“Observation has always been a foundational element of 
management and, indeed, of daily life. Only through observation can individuals 
and organizations understand and control their conditions.”).
22 Calvin Morrill & Danielle S. Rudes, Conflict Resolution in Organizations, 6 ANN.
REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 627, 629 (2010) (“Frederick Taylor developed the best-known 
engineering approach in scientific management, which operated from the premise 
that direct observation of work practices could provide the basis for optimal job 
design and worker productivity.”); see also Frederick Taylor, A Piece Rate System, 
Being a Step toward Partial Solution of the Labor Problem, 16 TRANSACTIONS 856 
(1895). Taylor was perhaps the most prominent member of the “systematic 
management” movement between 1880 and 1920. Sanford M. Jacoby, A Century of 
Human Resources Management, in INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS TO HUMAN RESOURCES 
AND BEYOND 147, 148 (Bruce E. Kaufman et al. eds., 2003).
23 BRUCE E. KAUFMAN, THE ORIGINS & EVOLUTION OF THE FIELD OF INDUSTRIAL 
RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 24 (1993); see also GORDON S. WATKINS, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF LABOR PROBLEMS 476-77 (1922) (“The old scientific 
management failed because it was not founded upon a full appreciation of the 
importance of the human factor. It was left to the new science of personnel 
management to discover and evaluate the human elements in production and 
distribution.”).
24 KAUFMAN, supra note 23, at 24. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3819897
THE LAW OF EMPLOYEE DATA: PRIVACY, PROPERTY, GOVERNANCE
9
to delve into the workers’ personal lives.25 The Department deployed a team 
of 150 to investigate the lifestyle of each Ford employee and their personal 
habits, such as smoking, drinking, and gambling, as well as their spending 
and saving habits.26 As it developed as a field of study, personnel 
management (later called human resources management) grew to include 
the use of psychological tests,27 organizational dynamics,28 and even the 
effects of monitoring itself.29
The last 20 years have seen a dramatic leap forward in the ability to 
collect and use massive sets of quantitative data. Colloquially known as “Big 
Data,” the combination of data and new tools to crunch the data has unlocked 
new insights about human behavior, revolutionizing the field of advertising 
and dramatically reshaping our consumer relationships.30 And its influence 
extends to all corners of our lives, from dating apps to traffic-displaying maps 
to recommended prison sentences.31 Big Data in the employment 
relationship—sometimes referred to as “people analytics”—has created a new 
25 Samuel M. Levin, Ford Profit Sharing, 1914-1920: I. The Growth of the Plan, in
HENRY FORD: CRITICAL EVALUATIONS IN BUSINESS AND MANAGEMENT 160, 163 (John 
C. Wood & Michael C. Wood eds., 2003) (noting that the Sociological Department’s 
investigations would “examine home conditions, to find out whether a man drinks, 
how he spends his evenings, whether he has a bank account, dependents, etc.”).
26 M. Todd Henderson, The Nanny Corporation, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1517, 1541 (2009) 
(footnotes omitted). Ford later disbanded the Sociological Department and stated: 
“Welfare work that consists in prying into employees’ private concerns is out of 
date.” HENRY FORD, MY LIFE AND WORK 130 (1922).
27 Maureen E. Mulvihill, Karraker v. Rent-A-Center: Testing the Limits of the ADA, 
Personality Tests, and Employer Preemployment Screening, 37 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 865, 
873 (2006).
28 Wickham Skinner, Managing Human Resources, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept. 1981.
29 See Fritz J. Roethlisberger, The Hawthorne Experiments, in CLASSICS OF 
PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT 16, 16-17 (Thomas H. Patten, Jr. ed., 1979).
30 ZUBOFF, supra note 14, at 138-55 (discussing the “dispossession” cycle of consumer 
data).
31 See FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT 
CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION (2015) (describing examples).
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data-driven approach to human resources management.32 One early example 
was popularized in the book and film Moneyball, which described how the 
general manager of baseball’s Oakland Athletics relied on quantitative data 
analysis rather than anecdotal scouting reports.33 The team’s methods in 
Moneyball seem downright rudimentary when compared with the 
sophisticated techniques in use today.34
The “people analytics” methodology can generally be broken down 
into two steps: (1) collecting pools of quantitative data from employees, and 
(2) analyzing the data to make workplace decisions.35 Technological advances 
have enabled employers to survey a vastly broader set of questions and 
answers using information from and about employees. The development and 
widespread use of the Internet, email, text messaging, and other recorded 
methods of interaction have made the collection of communication relatively 
costless for employers, going all the way back to the late 1990s.36 Video and 
audio recording are now done digitally, making them much easier to record 
and store.37 Other electronic devices record employee movement, browser 
history, heart rate, temperature, and interactions with other employees.38 One 
people-analytics invention, known as a “Sociometric Badge,” incorporates a 
32 Don Peck, They’re Watching You at Work, ATLANTIC, Dec. 2013, at 72, available at
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/12/theyre-watching-you-at-
work/354681/. See generally Matthew T. Bodie, Miriam A. Cherry, Marcia L. 
McCormick & Jintong Tang, The Law and Policy of People Analytics, 88 U. COLO. L.
REV. 961, 964-73 (2017).
33 MICHAEL LEWIS, MONEYBALL: THE ART OF WINNING AN UNFAIR GAME (2003).
34 See, e.g., Josh Bersin, The Geeks Arrive in HR: People Analytics Is Here, FORBES
(Feb. 1, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/joshbersin/2015/02/01/geeks-arrive-in-hr-
people-analytics-is-here/ (discussing a people analytics meeting involving “eight PhD 
statisticians, engineers, and computer scientists together, all working on people 
analytics for their companies”).
35 Bodie, Cherry, McCormick & Tang, supra note 32, at 973.
36 See, e.g., Lisa Guernsey, The Web: New Ticket to a Pink Slip, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 
1999, at G1 (“In 1999, at least 45 percent of employers said they monitored their 
employees’ phone calls, computer files or email messages, according to the 
American Management Association.”).
37 Ajunwa, Crawford & Schultz, supra note 18, at 738.
38 Id. at 743.
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microphone, an infra-red device, and a motion detector to measure aspects of 
human interactions.39 Employers can use the data from the badge to 
determine when employees are interacting, where, for how long, and with 
what level of emotional valence (based on sound data).40
To match up with this massive influx of data, automated decision 
systems—also known as algorithms, data analytics, machine learning, and 
artificial intelligence—are now much more sophisticated at crunching this 
data and providing novel insights. Rather than needing a specific hypothesis 
to test on the data, these new analytics tools can work through the numbers 
to find unexpected correlations.41 As one example, Google applies its own
brand of data analytics to its human resources department, which it calls 
“People Operations.”42 The company prides itself on taking HR decisions out 
of the hands of individual managers and instead giving them to groups.43
These decisionmakers are then given data and data-crunching algorithms to 
better manage their methods. Among the unusual approaches that Google 
has taken: paying talented workers much more than average workers in a 
particular job; shrinking plate sizes in the corporate cafeteria to reduce 
caloric intake; and adding perks like ATMs, microkitchens, and onsite 
laundry machines to help workers balance their professional and personal 
lives.44 For its “Project Aristotle,” an internal initiative to study the metrics of 
success between Google teams, the company collected data along a myriad of 
lines to determine what components created a top team.45
39 BEN WABER, PEOPLE ANALYTICS 14-16 (2013).
40 Id. at 179-81.
41 See Matthew T. Bodie, Workplace Freakonomics, 14 I/S: J.L. & POL'Y FOR INFO. SOC'Y
37, 38 (2017) (describing “freakonomics analytics” as those tools looking for 
“unusual, surprising, and counterintuitive correlations between various behaviors 
and phenomena that can only now be understood--or, at least, seen--through data 
analytics”). 
42 Adam Bryant, Quest to Build a Better Boss, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2011, at BU1 
(noting that “‘people operations’ . . . is Googlespeak for human resources”).
43 LASZLO BOCK, WORK RULES! 12 (2015).
44 Id.
45 Charles Duhigg, Group Study: What Google Learned From Its Quest to Build the 
Perfect Team, N.Y. TIMES, Magazine, at 20, 26 (Feb. 28, 2016) (finding that teams 
thrived most when they engendered a sense of psychological safety).
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3819897
THE LAW OF EMPLOYEE DATA: PRIVACY, PROPERTY, GOVERNANCE
12
Much of the data collected in this new environment could be 
considered personal—patterns of speech, laundry habits, and preferences for 
psychological safety. The line between person as individual and person as 
employee has become significantly blurred.46 The SARS-CoV-2 pandemic has 
only exacerbated this trend. Long considered to be particularly private 
information, employee health data has been thrust into the forefront as 
newly relevant to workplace operations.47 Employers are taking their workers’ 
temperatures, administering novel coronavirus tests, and managing the news 
of an employee’s positive test with other workers and medical professionals.48
Many employers are considering the use of contact tracing to determine who 
has come in contact with employees who catch the virus.49 Workers must
wear masks and self-quarantine, and may be required to vaccinate.50
46 Ajunwa, Crawford & Schultz, supra note 18, at 738-39 (“What is novel, and of real 
concern to privacy law, is that rapid technological advancements and diminishing 
costs now mean employee surveillance occurs both inside and outside the
workplace—bleeding into the private lives of employees.”); Leora Eisenstadt, Data 
Analytics and the Erosion of the Work/Nonwork Divide, 56 AM. BUS. L.J. 445, 448 
(2019) (“[T]he explosion of technological advances that allow employers to monitor 
and rely upon workers' off-duty conduct will likely weaken the dividing line between 
work and nonwork in dramatically greater and more troubling ways than ever 
before.”)
47 Russell Brandom, Workers from Amazon, Instacart, and Others Are Calling in Sick 
to Protest Poor Virus Protections, VERGE, May 1, 2020, 
https://www.theverge.com/2020/5/1/21243905/mayday-strike-boycott-amazon-target-
walmart-whole-foods-instacart-shiptstrike; Jill Colvin, Trump Order Keeps 
Meatpacking Plants Open, But Unions Say Workers Unsafe, CHI. TRIB., April 29, 
2020, https://www.chicagotribune.com/coronavirus/ct-nw-coronavirus-trump-
slaughterhouse-meatpacking-20200429-34sj5c3neray7jrylc7l3pnnfm-story.html; 
Adam Jeffery, Healthcare Workers Protest for Vital Protection Equipment, 
CNBC.COM, APRIL 20, 2020, https://www.cnbc.com/2020/04/18/healthcare-workers-
protest-for-vital-protection-equipment.html; 
48 Bodie & McMahon, supra note 17.
49 Ravindranath, supra note 17 (“Employers are rushing to use digital tracking 
technology to reduce virus transmission in the workplace.”).
50 Zlati Meyer, Can You Get Fired If You Don’t Get a COVID-19 Vaccine? Yes, FAST 
COMPANY, FEB. 19, 2021, https://www.fastcompany.com/90605815/can-you-get-fired-if-
you-dont-get-a-covid-vaccine-yes.
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Technology has also brought home and personal life into the 
workplace. Consider: the doctor who drunkenly assaulted an Uber driver; a 
CEO’s financial donation in support of California’s Proposition 8; a daycare 
worker’s Facebook post that she hates being around kids.51 In these cases, 
what employees considered to be private ended up becoming very public and 
ultimately affected the reputation of their employers. Information about one 
employee can change the valuation of a company, the arc of its business 
model, the sheen of its brand. This is obviously true when it comes to 
corporate leaders, as examples such as Steve Jobs, Martha Stewart, and Kylie 
Jenner illustrate.52 But even frontline workers can have an impact on the 
reputation of the company.53 In service-oriented businesses, the work of 
individual employees is the key to building the value of the brand.54
Reputation scores are available on dozens of websites, and social media can 
hold a vast mélange of observations and complaints about individual
customer interactions, making employees more important than ever to brand 
and business value.55 And information about what they do in their off time 
now has much broader ramifications.
51 Matthew Bodie, The Internet Wants You to Lose Your Job, QUARTZ.COM (Feb. 3, 
2016), https://qz.com/608697/the-internet-wants-you-to-lose-your-job/ (noting that 
employee misfires on social media affect brand reputation).
52 Tom C. W. Lin, Undressing the CEO: Disclosing Private, Material Matters of Public 
Company Executives, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 383, 384 (2009).
53 One drugstore-chain cashier was so warm and friendly with customers that a 
nationally syndicated talk show singled him out for praise. Joe Holleman, Local 
Walgreens Cashier Surprised in Store by Ellen DeGeneres, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH
(Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.stltoday.com/news/local/columns/joe-holleman/local-
walgreens-cashier-surprised-in-store-by-ellen-degeneres/article_b73acb94-2058-53e2-
820d-a21ca5e241e7.html.
54 See, e.g., TONY HSIEH, DELIVERING HAPPINESS: A PATH TO PROFITS, PASSION, AND 
PURPOSE (2010).
55 Marie-Cécile Cervellon & Pamela Lirio, When Employees Don’t ‘Like’ Their 
Employers on Social Media, MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV., Feb. 2017, 
https://sloanreview.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/f11dc7eeaa-3.pdf.
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In a growing number of employment relationships, employee-
generated data constitutes, in whole or in part, the output of the employer.56
To take but a few examples: doctors give medical advice and prescribe 
medicine; lawyers provide legal counsel and advocacy; comedians perform 
live or on a recorded medium. We understand this more intuitively when it 
comes to formal intellectual property: copyrights become the property of the 
firm through the “work-for-hire” doctrine, while most employee patents are 
assigned to the company as part of the employment agreement.57 But slippery 
sets of information have been enfolded into trade secret law, covering 
employee-created information such as client lists, marketing plans, business 
strategies—literally any information that has inherent economic value 
because it is not generally known or readily ascertainable by others, and 
which is kept private.58 In an era of Big Data, algorithms have become heavily 
guarded secrets, including not only their methods but also the data used to 
drive them.59 And that data is often provided by employees. Uber and Lyft, for 
example, track their employees as part of a huge algorithm of traffic and 
transportation that has significant value on its own.60 There is even evidence 
that some companies may be profiting from their employees’ data through 
sales to third parties.61 After all, the Enron Corpus was not only the day-to-day 
communication between individual employees; it was also a valuable dataset 
of human interaction with its own independent value.
The upshot is this: employment now means handing over even more 
of our individual selves, in the form of data, in service to a communal 
56 See JEREMIAS PRASSL, HUMANS AS A SERVICE: THE PROMISE AND PERILS OF WORK IN 
THE GIG ECONOMY (2018).
57 See Part II.B infra.
58 UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 529 (2005).
59 Sonia K. Katyal, Private Accountability in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, 66 
UCLA L. REV. 54, 123–24 (2019).
60 Tom Simonite, When Your Boss is an Uber Algorithm, MIT TECH. REV., Dec. 1, 
2015, https://www.technologyreview.com/2015/12/01/247388/when-your-boss-is-an-
uber-algorithm/. 
61 Adler-Bell & Miller, supra note 15 (discussing how corporate employee 
surveillance enables “a pernicious form of rent-seeking—in which companies 
generate huge profits by packaging and selling worker data in marketplace[s] 
hidden from workers’ eyes”).
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enterprise. Nothing seems to be off the table. In this world of employee 
embeddedness within an immersive world of data, how will law react to its 
construction of the employment relationship? Before answering this question, 
we first review the legal environment for worker data at present.
II. REGULATION OF EMPLOYEE DATA
Employers must abide by a variety of different statutory, regulatory, 
and common-law schemes when they are collecting and using employee data.
These schemes can be grouped into two rough categories: privacy protections 
for employees and their data, and the assignment of property rights as to 
employee data. Privacy law serves to protect information by punishing those 
who collect, use, or disclose the information without legal authorization or 
justification. Property law, on the other hand, protects information by giving 
the owner a bundle of potential rights over the use of the property.62 These 
two different legal regimes do not apply to the same sets of employee data, 
but together they create the topography from which employees and 
employers operate.63
A. Employee Privacy Protections
62 See Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA.
L. REV. 965, 967 (2004) (noting that Coase saw property as “a collection of use rights, 
the so-called ‘bundle of sticks’”).
63 For a discussion of the different ramifications between liability rules and property 
rules, see Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, 
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1115-17 (1972); 
see also Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Property Rights and Liability Rules: The Ex Ante 
View of the Cathedral, 100 MICH. L. REV. 601 (2001); Richard R.W. Brooks, The 
Relative Burden of Determining Property Rules and Liability Rules: Broken 
Elevators in the Cathedral, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 267, 291-92 (2002); Louis Kaplow & 
Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 
HARV. L. REV. 713, 715 (1996).
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3819897
THE LAW OF EMPLOYEE DATA: PRIVACY, PROPERTY, GOVERNANCE
16
No comprehensive U.S. privacy law protects employee’s information; 
rather, we have a loose network of provisions.64 The broadest set of 
protections comes from constitutional law and the common law. The U.S. 
Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth 
Amendment65 and potentially extends a federal right of information 
privacy,66 but these protections only apply to public-sector employees.67
California’s constitutional protections for privacy do protect both public- and 
private-sector employees;68 the California Supreme Court has analogized 
these protections to the privacy tort of intrusion upon seclusion recognized in 
American common law.69 The intrusion tort imposes liability when one has 
invaded “the solitude or seclusion of another or [their] private affairs or 
concerns” if the intrusion is “highly offensive to a reasonable person.”70
64 Alan F. Westin, Privacy in the Workplace: How Well Does American Law Reflect 
American Values?, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 271, 282–83 (1996) (“[T]he U.S. approach to 
privacy remains a more eclectic blend of constitutional interpretation, pin-pointed 
and sector-specific legislation, sector-based administrative agency rules, common-
law judicial interpretation, labor-management bargaining (where employees are 
union-represented), voluntary organizational policies, and market-based dynamics.”).
For a comparative look, see Arianne Renan Barzilay, Data Analytics at Work: A View 
from Israel on Employee Privacy and Equality in the Age of Data-Driven 
Employment Management, 40 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 421, 422 (2019).
65. See, e.g., O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725-26 (1987); City of Ontario v. Quon, 
560 U.S. 746, 756-57 (2010).
66 Nat'l Aeronautics & Space Admin. v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 138 (2011) (assuming, 
without deciding, that government workers had a right to information privacy).
67 Cf. Pauline T. Kim, Privacy Rights, Public Policy, and the Employment 
Relationship, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 671, 674 n.17 (1996) (“In rare cases, where a private 
employer is acting as an instrument or agent of the government, constitutional 
privacy protections may extend to workers in the private sector.”).
68 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 (providing for “inalienable rights” including “pursuing and 
obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy”); Hill v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 865 
P.2d 633 (Cal. 1994) (holding that held that the state's constitutional right of privacy 
extended to private actors, including private-sector employers).
69 Hernandez v. Hillsides, Inc., 211 P.3d 1063, 1073 (Cal. 2009) (“The right to privacy 
in the California Constitution sets standards similar to the common law tort of 
intrusion.”).
70 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3819897
THE LAW OF EMPLOYEE DATA: PRIVACY, PROPERTY, GOVERNANCE
17
Courts have found liability in a variety of workplace situations, such as when 
an employer spied on an employee to get information for a workers’ 
compensation claim,71 when “fake” employees were dispersed into the 
workforce to get private information about fellow workers,72 when lockers 
were searched without consent,73 and when cameras were installed in 
bathrooms or private offices.74 The Restatement of Employment Law has 
redefined the tort in the employment context to protect the physical person 
and physical and electronic locations75 as well as personal information.76 In 
addition, the Restatement prohibits the disclosure of information that was 
confidentially provided to the employer, in a manner similar to the tort of 
public disclosure of private fact.77
Beyond these constitutional and common-law protections are a 
collection of statutory and regulatory provisions that have at least a glancing 
relationship to employee data. But this collection is incomplete. As to 
personal data about an employee’s health, for example, the common law tort 
does provide some protection against collection and intrusion in extreme 
cases.78 But there is no federal or state law generally protecting the privacy of 
employee health information. Many believe the federal Health Information 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)79 applies to protect such data, but 
71 See, e.g., York v. General Electric Co., 759 N.E.2d 865 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001).
72 See, e.g., Johnson v. K-Mart Corp., 723 N.E.2d 1192 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
73 See, e.g., K-Mart Corp. Store No. 7441 v. Trotti, 677 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. App. 1984).
74 See, e.g., Elmore v. Atlantic Zayre, Inc., 341 S.E.2d 905, 906-907 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986) 
(bathroom); Hernandez v. Hillsides, Inc., 211 P.3d 1063, 1073 (Cal. 2009) (office).
75 RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 7.03 (AM. LAW INST. 2015).
76 Id. § 7.04.
77 Compare id. § 7.05 with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (AM. LAW INST.
1977).
78 Miller v. Motorola, Inc., 560 N.E.2d 900 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (employer disclosure of 
employee’s mastectomy). But see Feminist Women's Health Center v. Superior Court 
of Sacramento Co., 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 187, 195 (Cal. App. 3d 1997) (finding that a 
requirement that employees demonstrate self-cervical exams was not a privacy 
intrusion because of the employer’s “fundamental goal of educating women about 
the function and health of their reproductive systems”).
79 Health Information Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 
Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).
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HIPAA only covers health plans, health care providers, and health care 
clearinghouses.80 Employers are not covered unless they provide health care 
or self-administered health insurance coverage.81 And even covered entities 
need not comply with HIPAA as to employment records held in their role as 
employer.82 Other regimes are narrower in scope. The Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA) bars certain inquiries and examinations that would 
reveal employee disabilities or other health conditions.83 Massachusetts 
employers cannot ask their employees about HIV status.84 The Genetic 
Information Nondisclosure Act (GINA)85 was originally passed to protect 
against discrimination based on the results of genetic testing,86 but it has 
taken on a role as a protection against snooping around in employee’s genetic 
data.87 Statutes in roughly 75% of states also protect genetic information in 
80 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2020) (defining “covered entity” as a health plan, a health care 
clearinghouse, or a health care provider). 
81 See id. §§ 164.103, 164.105; Sharona Hoffman, Employing E-Health: The Impact of 
Electronic Health Records on the Workplace, 19 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 409, 419 
(2010) (“Employers who are self-insured can receive medical information from 
providers for payment purposes without their employees' authorization. Such 
employers are considered ‘hybrid’ entities whose business activities include both 
covered (insurance) and non-covered (employment) functions.”).
82 See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2020). In addition, covered entities may provide employee 
health information to employers in order “[t]o evaluate whether the individual has a 
work-related illness or injury.” Id. § 164.512(b)(v)(A)(2); see also id. § 164.504(f) (as a 
condition of providing the information, the covered entity must require the 
employer to protect the information and not use it for employment-related actions).
83 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d). The Seventh Circuit has held than an employer’s 
administration of the MMPI as part of a management test was a medical 
examination and violated the ADA. Karraker v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 411 F.3d 831, 
832 (7th Cir. 2005).
84 WIS. STAT. § 103.15(2).
85 Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 
881 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 & 42 U.S.C.).
86 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1 (making it an “unlawful employment practice for an employer 
to request, require, or purchase genetic information with respect to an employee or a 
family member of the employee”).
87 Bradley A. Areheart & Jessica L. Roberts, GINA, Big Data, and the Future of 
Employee Privacy, 128 YALE L.J. 710, 782 (2019) (“In a world of big data, GINA offers 
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employment, but these have had an “extremely limited impact.”88 The 
notable standout is Illinois’ Biometric Information Privacy Act, which 
provides a private right of action for improper collection, retention, or use of 
biometric data.89 Finally, some states regulate the use of drug tests on 
employees while generally permitting it.90
Other pockets of employee data find their own sets of regulatory 
oversight. The Federal Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) requires employers to 
get written authorization to obtain employee credit reports; employers must 
also provide notice to employees if the credit report is used to take adverse 
action against them.91 The FCRA only applies when employers receive or use 
consumer reports from consumer reporting agencies, but the term 
“consumer report” is construed broadly to include any information that goes 
to “character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of 
living.”92 Because the FCRA largely focuses on procedural requirements of 
notice and consent, employers can generally comply with the statutory 
scheme if they follow the rules.93 State and local legislation prohibits 
employers from using information of prior arrests of convections at certain 
points in the hiring process.94
a robust and unexpected safeguard against snooping by employers.”); cf. Gaia 
Bernstein, The Paradoxes of Technological Diffusion: Genetic Discrimination and 
Internet Privacy, 39 CONN. L. REV. 241, 258 (2006) (noting that “genetic 
discrimination by employers and insurers is rare and is generally on the decline”).
88 Areheart & Roberts, supra note 87, at 763.
89 Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 14/1 et seq. (2009).
90 MATTHEW W. FINKIN, PRIVACY IN EMPLOYMENT LAW 542-690 (2d ed. 2003) 
(describing state drug testing laws).
91 See Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681b(b)(1)-(3), 1681m. See also 
N.Y. Fair Credit Reporting Act, N.Y. Gen. Bus. L. § 380-b (regulating the use of credit 
reports).
92 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(1).
93 See Pauline T. Kim & Erika Hanson, People Analytics and the Regulation of 
Information Under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 61 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 17, 20 (2016) 
(“[A]lthough employers face significant liability risks if they disregard the statute's 
requirements, the FCRA in fact does little to curb invasive data collection practices 
or to address the risks of discriminatory algorithms.”).
94 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 4(9), (9A). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3819897
THE LAW OF EMPLOYEE DATA: PRIVACY, PROPERTY, GOVERNANCE
20
Beyond these clumps of regulatory attention, however, employer 
practices are largely free from privacy-related oversight. Employer are
allowed to monitor their employees as they wish; even continual electronic 
observation is permitted.95 Surveillance can be tortious when conducted at 
private locations without the employee’s consent, but observation from a 
public vantage is permitted.96 An employer cannot intercept an employee’s 
telephone or other electronic communications, even from the employer’s 
phone, without specific consent.97 Hidden surveillance can be legally 
problematic if undisclosed, but secrecy is generally permissible for 
95 See Ajunwa, Crawford & Schultz, supra note 18, at 747 (“There are no federal laws 
that expressly address employer surveillance or limit the intrusiveness of such 
surveillance.”); see also Vega-Rodriguez v. Puerto Rico Telephone Co., 110 F.3d 174
(1st Cir. 1997) (permitting the use of cameras to continually survey the employees’ 
work space).
96 Compare Pemberton v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 502 A.2d 1101, 1117 (Md. Spec. 
App. 1986) (holding that the use of a listening device within personal areas is 
generally actionable); Burns v. Masterbrand Cabinets, Inc., 874 N.E.2d 72 (Ill. App. 
2007) (remanding for further proceedings on intrusion claim when the employer’s 
investigator secretly videotaped an employee in his home after gaining entry on 
false pretenses), with ICU Investigations, Inc. v. Jones, 780 So. 2d 685 (Ala. 2000) (no 
intrusion when videotaped in front yard); York v. Gen. Elec. Co., 759 N.E.2d 865, 866 
(Ohio App. 2001) (no intrusion when employer representative observed the 
employee arriving at work, going into his chiropractor’s office, visiting a lawnmower 
repair shop, mowing his lawn, and riding a motorcycle).
97 See 18 U.S.C § 2511 (2012) (criminalizing the actions of a person who 
“intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to 
intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic communication”). 
The tap is not illegal if one of the parties (namely, the employee) consents to the tap. 
Id. § 2511(2)(c). However, courts have not been disposed to find implied consent. 
Watkins v. L.M. Berry, 704 F.2d 577 (11th Cir. 1983) (notice as to employer policy of 
interception did not establish consent). There is also a “business extension” exception 
that allows for monitoring “in the ordinary course of business. 18 U.S.C. § 
2510(5)(a)(i). However, listening in to personal calls is not generally within the 
ordinary course of business. See Watkins, 704 F.2d at 583. Wiretapping is also 
problematic under state common law. See Narducci v. Vill. of Bellwood, 444 F. Supp. 
2d 924 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (“Eavesdropping via wiretapping has been conspicuously 
singled out on several occasions as precisely the kind of conduct that gives rise to an 
intrusion-on-seclusion claim.”).
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significant and legitimate business reasons, such as to catch a thief.98 The 
National Labor Relations Act prohibits employer surveillance that would 
chill or otherwise interfere with its employees’ protected concerted activity.99
But otherwise there is no state or federal statutory regulation of employee 
monitoring.
Employers can also require employees to provide information as a 
condition of employment. In evaluating the propriety of employee 
interrogation, courts have looked primarily to the type of information being 
collected,100 viewing more favorably data collection that is job-related, skill-
related, and qualification-related.101 Personality testing has long been a staple 
of employers and is not usually problematic when mainstream tests are 
used.102 While questions on personality traits and emotional intelligence are 
seen as job-related, examinations that look beyond those elements and into 
98 See Marrs v. Marriott Corp., 830 F. Supp. 274 (D. Md. 1992) (permitting secret 
videotaping after hours to uncover thief); Sacramento Cty. Deputy Sheriffs’ Assoc. v. 
Cty. of Sacramento, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 834 (Ct. App. 1997) (theft of inmates’ property 
justified secret surveillance). But see Acuff v. IBP, Inc., 77 F. Supp. 2d 914, 927 (C.D. 
Ill. 1999) (videotaping nurse’s office during medical exams not justified by concerns 
about theft).
99 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1); see Charlotte Garden, Labor Organizing in the Age of 
Surveillance, 63 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 55, 60 (2018) (noting that “certain surveillance 
activities by employers have been illegal since the earliest days of the NLRA”).
100 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 117, at 121 (5th ed. 
1984) (“[H]ighly personal questions or demands by a person in authority may be 
regarded as an intrusion on psychological solitude or integrity and hence an 
invasion of privacy.”).
101 As discussed below, these standards for examination and the requirement of job-
relatedness had their genesis in the Supreme Court’s discussions of examinations in 
the context of disparate impact in employment discrimination law. Griggs v. Duke 
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971). 
102 The Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI), the Meyers-Briggs 
Type Indicator, the Rorschach Test, and the Thematic Apperception Test are among 
the most well-known and popular testing schema. The MMPI has been given to 
countless job applicants and serves as the foundation for many of the tests that 
employers use to assess applicants. Elizabeth D. De Armond, To Cloak the Within: 
Protecting Employees from Personality Testing, 61 DEPAUL L. REV. 1129, 1130 
(2012).
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confidential or demographic information may be on more shaky legal 
ground.103 The federal Employee Polygraph Protection Act, along with a 
number of related state statutes, severely restrict the use of polygraph tests in 
collecting employee biometric data in response to substantive questions.104
Relatively recent state legislation prohibits employers from requesting access 
to personal social-media accounts.105
After collecting data from workers, employers are generally able to 
use that data as they wish.106 Data aggregation can reveal much more about 
employees than one might expect.107 Such aggregation can feel disturbing, 
103 See Soroka v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 7 Cal. App. 77, 79-80 (1991) (asking for 
responses to such statements as “I feel sure that there is only one true religion. . . . I 
believe in the second coming of Christ. . . . My soul sometimes leaves my body. . . . I 
wish I were not bothered by thoughts about sex. . . . I am very strongly attracted by 
members of my own sex. . . . My sex life is satisfactory. . . . Many of my dreams are 
about sex matters.”). 
104 See, e.g., the Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-09 
(2012); D.C. CODE § 32-902; CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.2; IDAHO CODE §§ 44-903-44-904; 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:40A-1.
105 Many states have legislation prohibiting employers from requiring employee 
disclosure of social-media passwords. ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-2-124; CAL. LABOR CODE § 
980; COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-2-127; 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 55/10; LA. REV. STAT. 51:1953; 
MD. CODE, LAB. & EMP. § 3-712; MICH. COMP. LAWS § 37.273; NEV. REV. STAT. § 
613.135; N.H. REV. STAT. § 275:74; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:6B-5; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-4-
34; 40 OKLA. STAT. § 173.2; OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.330; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-56-3; 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1-1003; UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-48-201; WASH. REV. CODE § 
49.44.200; WIS. STAT. § 995.55. For a review of recent activity, see Access to Social 
Media Usernames and Passwords, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (July 
1, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-
technology/employer-access-to-social-media-passwords-2013.aspx. 
106 Cf. DANIEL SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 120 (2008) (“Most courts adhere to 
the secrecy paradigm, which fails to recognize any privacy interest in information 
publicly available or already disseminated to others.”).
107 In one example, Target used a wide variety of personal data—both generated by 
the store and purchased from external vendors—to develop consumer profiles 
including particular needs such as a pregnancy. Charles Duhigg, How Your 
Shopping Habits Reveal Even the Most Personal Information, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 
2012, Magazine, at 1. Employers have successfully developed similar profiles.
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even threatening, to employees, as it gives the employer an informational 
advantage. But there is little in the way of legal protection against such 
aggregation. Employers are not required to limit their use of the data for the 
purpose for which it was collected, or to ensure the accuracy of the data.108
There are restrictions on disclosure. Under the “public disclosure of private 
facts” tort, an employer may be liable if it gives publicity to private 
information.109 The duty of confidentiality generally arises from implicit or 
Valentina Zarya, Employers Are Quietly Using Big Data to Track Employee 
Pregnancies, FORBES (Feb. 17, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/02/17/castlight-
pregnancy-data/.
108 Bodie, Cherry, McCormick & Tang, supra note 32. The U.S. government is 
restricted as to secondary uses of data. See, e.g., Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 
552a(e)(3)(B) (2012). Drug testing is one exception, as the accuracy of the test has 
been used as one factor in considering its permissibility. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 
8-73-108(5)(e)(IX.5) (requiring the drug test to be “conducted by a medical facility or 
laboratory licensed or certified to conduct such tests”); IOWA CODE § 730.5.. Cf. 
Hennessey v. Coastal Eagle Point Oil Co., 609 A.2d 11, 13 (N.J. 1992) (noting that the 
drug test “included several features in the testing program to ensure minimum 
intrusion and maximum accuracy”); Sims v. NCI Holding Corp., 759 N.W.2d 333, 338 
(Iowa 2009) (noting that “the legislature’s intent was to ensure the accuracy of any 
drug test serving as the basis for adverse employment action.”).
109 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (AM. LAW INST. 1977); see also 
RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 7.05(b) (AM. LAW INST. 2015) (“An employer 
intrudes upon the [employee’s] privacy interest . . . by providing or allowing third 
parties access to . . . employee information [provided in confidence] without the 
employee’s consent.”). The tort requires that the information be made public.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. a (“‘Publicity,’ on the other hand, 
means that the matter is made public, by communicating it to the public at large, or 
to so many persons that the matter must be regarded as substantially certain to 
become one of public knowledge.”). However, a line of cases has found public 
disclosure when there is a “special relationship” between the victim and the receivers 
of the private information. See, e.g., Miller v. Motorola, Inc., 560 N.E.2d 900, 903 (Ill. 
App. 1990) (“Where a special relationship exists between the plaintiff and the ‘public’ 
to whom the information has been disclosed, the disclosure may be just as 
devastating to the person even though the disclosure was made to a limited number 
of people.”). Employees have been held to have a special relationship with their 
fellow employees, even when their numbers are relatively small. Id. (“Plaintiff’s 
allegation that her medical condition was disclosed to her fellow employees 
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explicit promises, fiduciary relationships, specific statutory or regulatory 
requirements, or ethical rules or codes, and these may apply in certain 
employment relationships.110 But employers are generally not considered to 
be fiduciaries of their employees’ data unless they have specifically assumed 
that duty.111 Once again, employers are fairly free to use worker data once 
collected.
Employees’ privacy interests may also be infringed when employers 
allow their data to be accessed through faulty or negligent security systems, 
and certain statutes do impose security requirements on certain types of 
information.112 In the 2014 Sony Pictures hack, 100 terabytes of employee 
data—including emails and financial, medical, and other personal 
information—were stolen from Sony’s system.113 Employee plaintiffs alleged 
that Sony’s inadequate security measures allowed the hack to take place, and
the case was ultimately settled.114 Other employee claims related to 
sufficiently satisfies the requirement that publicity be given to the private fact.”); 
Karch v. BayBank FSB, 794 A.2d 763, 774 (N.H. 2002) (concluding that disclosure of 
employee’s private information to employer’s officers and other employees could 
constitute sufficient publicity).
110 RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 7.05, Reporters’ Notes to cmt. a at 345 (AM.
LAW INST. 2015).
111 See Scott L. Fast, Comment, Breach of Employee Confidentiality: Moving Toward 
a Common Law Tort Remedy, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 431 (1993) (discussing the potential 
for the confidentiality tort in the workplace); cf. Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, 
Privacy’s Other Path: Recovering the Law of Confidentiality, 96 GEO. L.J. 123 (2007) 
(comparing the broad confidentiality common-law protection in the U.K. with the 
overall reluctance of U.S. courts to adopt breach of confidentiality outside of limited 
settings).
112 HIPAA regulations require that covered entities “protect against any reasonably 
anticipated threats or hazards to the security or integrity” of protected health 
information. 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(a)(2) (2015).
113 Corona v. Sony Pictures Entm’t, Inc., No. 14-CV-09600 RGK EX, 2015 WL 3916744, 
at *1 (C.D. Cal. June 15, 2015).
114 Assoc. Press, Sony Pictures Settles with Former Workers in Data Breach Lawsuit, 
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 2, 2015, 8:49 PM ET), http://www.wsj.com/articles/sony-pictures-
settles-with-former-workers-in-data-breach-lawsuit-1441241363. 
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unintentional disclosures have not been successful.115 All fifty states have 
data breach notification laws which would apply to employers when there is a 
data breach involving employee personal data.116
B. Property Rights in Employee Data
Labor has been cited as a traditional justification for property rights—
as the reason why a person should be able to own her own creation.117 But 
when operating within the aegis of a firm, workers contribute their labor to 
the firm in exchange for payment, contributing their labor to the collective 
115 See Bodah v. Lakeville Motor Express, Inc., 663 N.W.2d 550 (Minn. 2003) (finding 
no liability when social security numbers were faxed out to sixteen different 
business locations); Allison v. Aetna, Inc., No. 09–2560, 2010 WL 3719243 (E.D. Pa. 
March 9, 2010) (dismissing complaint for lack of standing due to the absence of any 
injury in fact to employees after data breach.).
116 Security Breach Notification Laws, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGIS., July 17, 2020, 
https://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-
technology/security-breach-notification-laws.aspx (“All 50 states, the District of 
Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands have enacted legislation 
requiring private or governmental entities to notify individuals of security breaches 
of information involving personally identifiable information.”).
117 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 328-29 (P. Laslett rev. ed. 1963) (3d 
ed. 1698) (“Whatsoever then he removes out of the State that Nature hath provided, 
and left it in, he hath mixed his Labour with, and joyned to it something that is his 
own, and thereby makes it his Property.”). The post-revolutionary New Hampshire 
legislature justified its intellectual property law with the sentiment “there being no 
property more peculiarly a man's own than that which is produced by the labour of 
his mind.” John O. McGinnis, The Once and Future Property-Based Vision of the 
First Amendment, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 49, 80 (1996) (quoting Act for the 
Encouragement of Literature (1783)).
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enterprise.118 Academics have cited to this process of joint or team production 
as the justification for the firm itself.119
Intellectual property has largely followed this division of ownership in 
the context of employment: rights generally end up in the hands of the 
employer. Information produced by employees falls under the major 
categories of intellectual property: copyright, patent, trade secrets, trademark, 
and publicity. Copyright, a product of federal law, protects “original works of 
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression,” such as novels, 
songs, and films.120 It applies to such works when created by individuals or 
groups.121 Employees generally lose copyright protection for their works 
when created within the context of employment. The “work-for-hire” doctrine, 
originally established in the 1909 Copyright Act, specified that the author of 
a copyrighted work “shall include an employer in the case of works made for 
hire.”122 The Copyright Act of 1976 modified the doctrine to make the 
employer the author of any work made for hire unless expressly agreed 
otherwise.123 The 1976 Act defines “work made for hire” as “a work prepared 
by an employee within the scope of his or her employment.”124 This rule of 
ownership can only be altered by a signed, written document that expressly 
118 Lily Kahng, Who Owns Human Capital?, 94 WASH. U.L. REV. 607, 615 (2017) 
(“Although labor is always integral to the productive use of capital, intellectual 
capital is particularly labor-intensive and often requires workers' knowledge, 
experience, and skills.”).
119 Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and 
Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 777-78 (1972); see also Margaret M. 
Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV.
247, 249–50 (1999).
120 17 U.S.C. § 102.
121 See Anthony J. Casey & Andres Sawicki, Copyright in Teams, 80 U. CHI. L. REV.
1683, 1685 (2013) (discussing the collaborative production of copyrightable 
material).
122 Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, §23, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080 (repealed 1976).
123 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (“In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other
person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this 
title, and, unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument 
signed by them, owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright.”)
124 Id. § 101.
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changes it.125 So when employees draft a screenplay, perform a part, or 
develop a software program in the context of employment, their employer 
owns the copyright.126
If copyright might be said as a general matter to concern the 
expression of artistic works, then patent concerns concepts relating to the 
useful arts. Federal law defines a patentable invention as “any new and useful 
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and 
useful improvement thereof.”127 Because patent law looks to a human 
inventor as the recipient of the patent rights, the employee who invents the 
patent is the author.128 However, employers are free to contract with 
employees explicitly for the rights to all inventions created within the scope 
of employment. Even without an explicit contract, judges have found 
something akin to a work-for-hire doctrine when an employee is hired to 
work on a specific invention or problem; courts are more likely to conclude 
that “the employee was hired to invent and therefore the firm owned all 
patents” through an implied contract.129 In addition, under the shop-right 
doctrine, employers enjoy a non-exclusive right to use the patent without 
125 Id. § 201(b).
126 See also Matthew T. Bodie, Lessons from the Dramatists Guild for the Platform 
Economy, 2017 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 17, 23–24 (2017) (discussing the difference between 
dramatists, who work as independent contractors and own their dramatic works, and 
screenwriters, who work for production companies or studios and hand over their 
rights to those entities).
127 35 U.S.C. § 101.
128 The patent must be registered by the individual inventor. See 35 U.S.C. § 111, 115 
(2006) (discussing oath taken as part of patent process that the registrant is the 
“original and first inventor”). 
129 CATHERINE L. FISK, WORKING KNOWLEDGE: EMPLOYEE INNOVATION AND THE RISE OF 
CORPORATE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, 1800-1930 180 (2009). See also Dan L. Burk, 
Intellectual Property and the Firm, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 15 (2004) (“In the absence of 
explicit contractual terms requiring an assignment, an implied duty to assign may be 
found. Courts have tended to recognize such an implied duty to assign patent rights
in situations where an employee hired to solve a problem engages in research, and 
the invention relates to that effort.”).
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having to compensate the employee. A shop right arises when the employee 
has created the invention on the job using the employer’s materials.130
To what extent is employee data included within the scope of 
employment even if not specifically part of the employees’ contracted-for 
performance? Employers have been casting a wider and wider net, through 
by IP law and contracts, over the ideas and creations of their employees.131 In 
some instances, the fights involve content that is related to the employee’s 
primary work but arguably developed outside of the actual work 
relationship.132 In other cases, the work will involve the employee but will not 
relate to that employee’s expected work product. For example, the emails and 
other works within the Enron Corpus are arguably protected by copyright. If 
considered within the scope of work-for-hire, they would have been the 
property of Enron; if outside the scope, then they would belong to the 
individual employees. These claims have not been litigated, and the Corpus is 
generally considered to be abandoned material.133 But the scope of the “scope 
of employment” remains up for grabs.
130 FISK, supra note 129, at 118; Burk, supra note 129, at 16.
131 Orly Lobel, The New Cognitive Property: Human Capital Law and the Reach of 
Intellectual Property, 93 TEX. L. REV. 789 (2015).
132 See id. at 797-803 (discussing examples involving a computer algorithm and a 
design for a new toy line).
133 Amana Levendowski provides the following analysis:
The Enron emails are often colloquially referred to as being in the 
“public domain,” but that is a legal misstatement. While the Enron 
emails are available online publicly, they are more like orphan works: 
using the works still carries some risk, as getting permission from 
each of the authors is highly unlikely, but the comparative likelihood 
of a copyright infringement lawsuit is perhaps even more unlikely. 
The effect is that the Enron emails are perceived as posing an 
infinitesimally low legal risk because, though some of the Enron 
emails are protectable under copyright law, the practical likelihood of 
former Enron employees suing for copyright infringement is 
exceedingly remote.
Levendowski, supra note 8, at 610–11.
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Trade secrets have become significantly more important in the Big 
Data economy.134 Protected through the common law and state statutes, trade 
secrets are defined as information that derives economic value from not 
being generally known or ascertainable and is the subject of reasonable 
efforts to maintain its secrecy.135 Trade secrets can be almost any type of 
business information: a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, 
method, technique, or process.136 Often the result of employee labor, trade 
secrets may be considered to be general knowledge that can be taken by the 
employee when she leaves the job. The law prohibits an individual’s personal 
or professional skills from counting as a firm’s trade secrets,137 but 
commentators fear that a combination of trade secret expansion and 
contractual provisions will sweep up employees’ informational capital into 
the employer’s domain.138 Employees are generally presumed to have an 
implied duty to keep any trade secrets to which they are exposed 
confidential.139 Moreover, a few jurisdictions have applied the doctrine of 
134 There is a lively academic debate over whether trade secrets should be consider 
an independent category of independent property law. Compare Robert G. Bone, A 
New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of Justification, 86 CALIF. L. REV.
241 (1998) (arguing it does not make sense as an independent body of law); Thorton 
Robison, The Confidence Game: An Approach to the Law About Trade Secrets, 25 
ARIZ. L. REV. 347, 383-84 (1983) (contending that trade secret protections should 
largely be contractual) with Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating 
Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV. 311, 313 (justifying trade secrets as a 
form of intellectual property). See also Michael Risch, Why Do We Have Trade 
Secrets?, 11 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (2007) (discussing the debate).
135 UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 529 (2005).
136 Risch, supra note 134.
137 ELIZABETH A. ROWE & SHARON K. SANDEEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TRADE 
SECRET LAW 40 (2012).
138 See, e.g., Lobel, supra note 131.
139 See Unistar Corporation v. Child, 415 So.2d 733, 734 (Fla. 3d Ct. App. 1982) (“The 
law will import into every contract of employment a prohibition against the use of a 
trade secret by the employee for his own benefit, to the detriment of his employer, if 
the secret was acquired by the employee in the course of his employment.”); Derek P. 
Martin, Comment, An Employer’s Guide to Protecting Trade Secrets from Employee 
Misappropriation, 1993 BYU L. REV. 949, 953 (“For most employees the law presumes 
a confidential relationship between employer and employee for the purposes of 
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“inevitable disclosure” of trade secrets to enjoin employees who (according to 
the court) must inevitably use the trade secrets they have learned at their old 
position.140 A study of trade secret litigation found that 85% of cases involved 
either current or former employees or business partners.141
Trademarks allow a producer of goods or services to identify 
themselves as the source of those goods or services, and to prevent others 
from doing so.142 One of the primary justifications for trademark is to allow 
consumers to understand where goods come from in an understandable and 
efficient manner.143 At first thought, trademark might not seem to have that 
much to do with employee data. But trademark makes a special connection 
between the firm, its employees, and intellectual property. Just as patent and 
copyright protections allocate rights between employee and employer as to 
creative and useful works, trademark allocates rights as to good will and 
protecting trade secrets.”). Employers often supplement or reify this trade secret 
protection with contractual provisions extending employer protection to all 
confidential information, even beyond trade secret law. See Lobel, supra note 131, at 
809.
140 See, e.g., PepsiCo v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262 (7th Cir. 1995); Rebecca J. Berkun, The 
Dangers of the Doctrine of Inevitable Disclosure in Pennsylvania, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. &
EMP. L. 157, 157 (2003) (“The doctrine of inevitable disclosure restricts an employee's 
future employment if that employee will inevitably use a former employer's trade 
secrets in the course of the future employment.”).
141 David S. Almeling et al., A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret Litigation in Federal 
Courts, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 291, 294 (2010). The study also found that trade secret owners 
were “twice as likely to prevail on a motion for preliminary relief when they sued 
employees as when they sued business partners.” Id. However, owners were also “over 
70% more likely to lose a motion to dismiss when they sued employees than business 
partners.” Id.
142 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (defining a trademark as “[a]ny word, name, symbol or device or 
any combination thereof [used] to identify and distinguish his or her goods, 
including a unique product, from those manufactured or sold by others and to 
indicate the source of the goods, even if that source is unknown”).
143 Mark P. McKenna, A Consumer Decision-Making Theory of Trademark Law, 98 
VA. L. REV. 67, 73 (2012) (“According to the dominant theoretical account, trademark 
law operates to enable consumers to rely on trademarks as repositories of 
information about the source and quality of products, thereby reducing the costs of 
searching for goods that satisfy their preferences.”).
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reputation.144 Trademarks transfer reputational assets to the firm and deprive 
individual employees of their ability to hold up the firm or exploit the trade 
dress separately.145 Employees cannot leave their employers and still claim to 
be providing goods or services under the existing trademark; an employer, on 
the other hand, could fire every employee and still claim the same mark.
The right of publicity has been characterized both as a right to 
privacy146 as well as a personal IP right—something akin to trademark for 
people.147 Essentially, the right of publicity allows an individual to prevent 
others from using her persona—her name, image, likeness, or other indicia of 
identity—without consent.148 The justifications for the right generally involve 
investment—financial, emotional, or moral—in one’s reputation and 
identity.149 Claims usually involve efforts to advertise, endorse, or provide 
144 Dan L. Burk & Brett H. McDonnell, Trademarks and the Boundaries of the Firm, 51 
WILLIAM & MARY L. REV. 345, 363-64 (2009).
145 Id. at 376-79.
146 The right to publicity has its origins in tort law and was one of Dean Prosser’s 
original four privacy torts. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (AM. LAW INST.
1977) (providing protection against the appropriation of one’s name or likeness). See 
Eric E. Johnson, Disentangling the Right of Publicity, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 891, 897 
(2017) (“One such theme is that the right of publicity is said to have evolved 
progressively from a tort cause of action to a form of intellectual property.”).
147 Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, What the Right of Publicity Can Learn from 
Trademark Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (2006); see also Barton Beebe, What 
Trademark Law Is Learning from the Right of Publicity, 42 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 389 
(2019) (arguing that trademark and publicity “are converging in many important 
ways, giving us the worst of both worlds”).
148 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (“One who 
appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or likeness of another is subject to 
liability to the other for invasion of his privacy.”); Jennifer E. Rothman, The Right of 
Publicity's Intellectual Property Turn, 42 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 277, 278 (2019) (“The 
right of publicity is something we all have--it is a state law that gives a person the 
right to stop others from using our identities--particularly our names and likenesses 
without permission--usually for a defendant's advantage.”).
149 Beebe, supra note 147, at 391 (noting the following justifications: incentivizing the 
creation of celebrity personas; preventing tarnishment of those personas; rewarding 
the labor that goes in to the development of a valuable personal identity; preventing 
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some other commercial use.150 The right of publicity has not been litigated 
much within the employment relationship. Actors and athletes understand 
the value of their identity and the potential to lose control over it.151 However, 
as the right of publicity has drifted closer to a property right, the ownership 
and assignability of identities has come into question. Employees who can 
assign their identities over to their employer might lose control over those
identities.152 Perhaps more than any other of these information-related rights, 
the right of publicity is uniquely personal.
The range of employer rights from copyright, patent, trade secrets, 
trademark, and publicity serve to capture a greater and greater quantity of
employee data.153 In addition to these property and/or liability rights, 
employers have been more and more aggressive about asserting control over 
employee information through contract provisions such as covenants not to 
compete and nondisclosure agreements.154 Between mandatory property 
assignments, default rules, and employer-created contract provisions, there is 
very little daylight for employees to claim property rights over their 
employment information. Instead, firms are amassing more and more pools 
of worker data, putting them at risk for loss of control, displacement, and 
alienation.
misappropriation or unjust enrichment of that value; and protecting the individual 
liberty and dignitary interests of identity holders).
150 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
151 LATE NIGHT WITH DAVID LETTERMAN, May 30, 1983, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oFYeut7L2gg (interview with Carrie Fisher) 
(discussing Fisher’s lack on input on the use of her likeness as Princess Leia in the 
production of toys, figurines, and shampoo bottles).
152 Rothman, supra note 148, at 280. See also JENNIFER E. ROTHMAN, THE RIGHT OF 
PUBLICITY: PRIVACY REIMAGINED FOR A PUBLIC WORLD 5-6 (2018) (illustrating the 
dangers of assignability).
153 Kahng, supra note 118, at 612 (“Intellectual capital includes not only separable, 
identifiable, and legally protected assets such as patents, trademarks, and copyrights, 
but also less distinct assets such as information systems, administrative structures
and processes, market and technical knowledge, brands, trade secrets, organizational 
know-how, culture, strategic capabilities, and customer satisfaction.”).
154 Lobel, supra note 131.
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III. FAILING PARADIGMS IN THE REGULATION OF EMPLOYEE DATA
Even though U.S. law has taken a laissez-faire approach to the 
collection and use of employee data, it has provided limited protections
through privacy rights and intellectual property. Ultimately, however, the 
entire enterprise has begun to founder on the underlying assumptions that 
frame these regulatory regimes. This Part examines the collapse of two 
primary paradigms that used to support the legal infrastructure: the 
separation of personal information from business-related information, and 
the ability of the employee to separate herself from the firm. The breakdown 
of these paradigms will be illustrated in two different sets of workers: drivers 
for ride-sharing companies like Uber and Lyft, and professional athletes. The 
different consequences of datafication for these two groups of workers
demonstrate the importance of relative economic power in the absence of 
countervailing legal power.
A. The Divide between Personal and Business-Related
Law and culture in the United States have reinforced the notion that 
the world of work is segregable from one’s personal life. Sometimes 
analogized as separate spheres, people are expected to have one mindset 
while at home and another while in the workplace.155 The dividing line 
between work and home has played an important role in allowing employers 
fairly unlimited power with the workplace.156 But this division rests on the 
shaky foundation that the work self can be separated from the personal self.
The development of data-based approach to human resources has 
highlighted the potential benefits of data-driven inquiries, including data that 
would be considered personal. The “people analytics” phenomenon involves
the search for new pools of quantitative data that are correlated with business 
155 See Naomi Schoenbaum, The Law of Intimate Work, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1167, 1174 
(2015) (discussing the history of the concept).
156 See ELIZABETH ANDERSON, PRIVATE GOVERNMENT: HOW EMPLOYERS RULE OUR 
LIVES (AND WHY WE DON’T TALK ABOUT IT) 37-39 (2017) (describing the workplace as 
a dictatorship that “does not recognize a personal or private sphere of autonomy free 
from sanction”).
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and employment success.157 Much of that data can be taken from the 
workplace as the employee engages in productive labor. But employers are 
now diving much deeper into the person’s intimate physical and 
psychological profile. One’s health affects work performance; illness can 
infect coworkers.158 Companies can track and collect data on employee eye 
movements, heart rate, gait, speech patterns, and temperature.159 They can 
see websites visited, notes sent to coworkers, likes on social media. Their 
understanding of employees can be much more comprehensive. And it is 
tempting—indeed, it may seem like good HR policy—to use that data to help 
workers do a better job.160 This impulse dates back at least to Ford’s 
Sociological Department, but the ability to act upon it has been magnified 
many times over.
In many fields, the line between one’s personal and professional 
identities has been vigorously smudged. Social media is a primary culprit, as 
various platforms encourage a blend of work and personal connections. The 
examples are legion of political, cultural, or personal opinions that caused 
controversy on social media and led to discipline or discharge.161 While critics 
bemoan the rise of “cancel culture,”162 social media has expanded public 
exposure to what were heretofore private thoughts.163 When the unpopular or 
offensive views become associated with the company by virtue of the 
157 See Bodie, Cherry, McCormick & Tang, supra note 32, at 965.
158 Jenna Wortham, The Down Load, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE 52, 54 (Feb. 21, 2021) 
(noting that sick workers cost companies $575 billion in 2019, and likely 
significantly more in 2020).
159 See Part I supra.
160 See Wortham, supra note 158, at 54-56 (discussing the attraction of workplace 
wellness programs for employers).
161 Bodie, supra note 51.
162 Yascha Mounk, Stop Firing the Innocent, ATLANTIC, June 27, 2020, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/06/stop-firing-innocent/613615/.
163 See Ligaya Mishan, The Long and Tortured History of Cancel Culture, N.Y. TIMES 
STYLE MAG., Dec. 3, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/03/t-magazine/cancel-
culture-history.html (discussing the history of public sanction for unpopular 
opinions).
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employment connection, termination often follows.164 As a result, workers 
must consider the employment ramifications for almost any activity—
including texts that could be screenshotted or actions that could be recorded 
on video and uploaded.165 And in a twist, employees in front-facing and 
leadership positions are often encouraged to develop attractive social media 
presences and share details of their private life. Higher numbers of followers 
and viral posts can translate into career advantages across many occupations.
The coronavirus pandemic has exacerbated the collapse of the 
personal/business divide in almost every respect.166 With shut-downs and 
quarantines at the outset of the pandemic, over fifty percent of workers found 
themselves working at home; those numbers have drifted down to about a 
third but are still much higher than before.167 Using telework software allows 
employees to engage in their jobs but still leaves them in their homes. For 
those workers who must physically be present on the job, their health and the 
health of their coworkers has greater salience than ever. Many employers 
have instituted testing, tracing, and disclosure programs that monitor 
employee temperature, symptoms, and movements to contain the virus.168
164 The examples are too numerous to recount. For recent examples, see Aaron 
Couch, Tatiana Siegel & Borys Kit, Behind Disney's Firing of 'Mandalorian' Star Gina 
Carano, HOLLYWOOD REPORTER, Feb. 16, 2021, 
https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/heat-vision/behind-disneys-firing-of-
mandalorian-star-gina-carano; Ashley Collman, A New York Times Editor Lost Her 
Job after She Tweeted about Having 'Chills' about Biden's Inauguration, BUS. INSIDER
(Jan 25, 2021, 6:36 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/nyt-editor-lauren-wolfe-
loses-job-pro-biden-tweet-2021-1; Mounk, supra note 162 (discussing examples).
165 See Bodie, supra note 51 (discussing medical resident who was recorded on video 
mistreating an Uber driver).
166 Wortham, supra note 158, at 54 (“The distinction between work and everything 
else, already a blurry line for most Americans, got even blurrier.”).
167 Megan Brenan, COVID-19 and Remote Work: An Update, GALLUP.COM, Oct. 13, 
2020, https://news.gallup.com/poll/321800/covid-remote-work-update.aspx; see also 
Nicholas Bloom, How Working from Home Works Out, STANFORD INSTITUTE FOR 
ECONOMIC POLICY RESEARCH, June 2020, 
https://siepr.stanford.edu/research/publications/how-working-home-works-out 
(finding that 42% of workers were primarily working at home).
168 See Bodie & McMahon, supra note 17.
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Indeed, workers want employers to reduce the possibility of cross-infection 
within their ranks.169
This disintegration of the personal/business divide substantially 
weakens protections for worker data rights through privacy law and 
intellectual property law.170 To a significant extent, U.S. law protects privacy 
within employment by drawing a line between personal information and 
business-related information. If that line breaks down, then so do the privacy 
protections.
The law already assumes that workers have little expectation of 
privacy while actually at work. Surveillance is presumed.171 But technology 
has supercharged the ability to monitor, both in terms of quantity and 
quality. Employers can collect certain standard kinds of data much more 
easily and cheaply: phone calls are automatically logged, website URLs listed 
as they are visited, and video cameras can store hundreds of hours of 
recordings digitally.172 The methods of collection grow ever more creative.
One recent innovation is a “smart” office chair cushion that records bad 
posture, heart rates, and time away from the chair.173 There seem to be 
limitless examples of new ways in which employers monitor and collect data 
from their employees.174
169 See NY Attorney General Letitia James Sues Amazon For Failure To Protect 
Workers During COVID-19 Pandemic, EAST N.Y. NEWS, Feb. 19, 2021, 
https://eastnewyork.com/ny-attorney-general-letitia-james-sues-amazon-for-failure-to-
protect-workers-during-covid-19-pandemic/ (lawsuit alleging that employees were 
disciplined or fired for raising concerns about coronavirus spread).
170 Ajunwa, Crawford & Schultz, supra note 18, at 738-39 (“What is novel, and of real 
concern to privacy law, is that rapid technological advancements and diminishing 
costs now mean employee surveillance occurs both inside and outside the 
workplace--bleeding into the private lives of employees.”).
171 See, e.g., Vega-Rodriguez v. Puerto Rico Telephone Co., 110 F.3d 174, 180 (1st Cir. 
1997) (“The appellants concede that, as a general matter, employees should expect to 
be under supervisors' watchful eyes while at work.”).
172 Ajunwa, Crawford & Schultz, supra note 18, at 742-44.
173 Tiffany May & Amy Chang Chien, Slouch or Slack Off, This “Smart” Office Chair 
Cushion Will Record It, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2021, https: //nyti.ms/3shJ8XW.
174 Ajunwa, Crawford & Schultz, supra note 18.
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The law has endeavored to provide some space for personal privacy 
and autonomy in the workplace, but those efforts growing increasingly 
quixotic. Tort law has protected employees against invasions into their 
persons, personal space, and personal effects.175 Workers have a reasonable 
expectation that employers will not surveil them in the bathroom or open up 
their purses or wallets without notice or consent.176 Even offices can provide 
an expectation of privacy when the door is closed.177 But the carve-out for 
personal privacy at work is diminishing. Workers can no longer take a 
moment away from a supervisor’s gaze when cameras and GPS devices are 
always on. It may generally impermissible to record personal phone calls by 
workers knowingly,178 but emails, texts, chats, listservs, and social media all 
preserve communications de rigueur. Information that was traditionally kept 
private because of the cost or complication in collecting it is now much more 
freely available.
Privacy law also has more difficulty separating work from home when 
the two have blended together. The observation of employees at home 
violates the expectation of privacy absent specific justifications, such as 
employer investigations of an employee’s alleged disability.179 Even in those 
cases, use of visual technology—binoculars, telescopic lenses—is generally 
forbidden.180 But what if the employer is invited into the home through an 
app or a laptop? What if the employee works from home? Several states 
175 RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 7.03 (AM. LAW INST. 2015) (stating that an 
employee has “a protected privacy interest” against employer intrusion into “the 
employee's physical person, bodily functions, and personal possessions”).
176 Id. § 7.03 cmt. b.
177 Hernandez v. Hillsides, Inc., 211 P.3d 1063, 1073 (Cal. 2009).
178 See, e.g., Deal v. Spears, 980 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir. 1992) (finding that recording 
personal employee calls violated the Wiretap Act).
179 RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 7.03 cmt. d (AM. L. INST. 2015) (noting that 
privacy interests “include nonworkplace physical or electronic locations in which the 
employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy, such as the employee's home, 
property, and personal possessions”).
180 Id. § 7.03 illus. 18 (”X hires an investigator to report back on employee E's off-duty 
activities. As part of her investigation, the investigator uses high-powered binoculars 
to observe E within his home. The use of high-powered binoculars to view what 
otherwise could not be seen is an intrusion upon E's privacy.”).
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require employers to follow certain protocols when electronically monitoring 
their employees, but these primarily require notice or consent.181 Unlike 
other countries, there are no mandatory “turn off” or disconnect periods—
employees can be asked to remain accessible regardless of the hour.182 And 
under employment at will, employees can be terminated for their off-duty 
conduct, with only limited protections for political or religious activity.183
The personal/business divide is also critical to intellectual property 
law. The Enron Corpus seems like the property of the Enron Corporation and 
its successors in bankruptcy. The emails, calendar entries, and tasks had all 
been entered into the employer’s Outlook system and were collected in the 
employer’s proprietary database. It is true that individual employees might 
have some claims to copyright protection for “original works of authorship 
fixed in any tangible medium of expression.”184 But those claims would only 
181 California makes it a misdemeanor to use an electronic tracking device to follow 
the location or movement of a person without her consent. CAL. PENAL CODE § 637.7 
(West 2020); see also Kendra Rosenberg, Location Surveillance by GPS: Balancing an 
Employer's Business Interest with Employee Privacy, 6 WASH. J. L. TECH. & ARTS 143, 
149 (2010). The California Consumer Privacy Act also requires the employer to 
provide notice of data collection to its employees; this notice must include the type 
of personal information collected and its intended use also CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 
1798.145(h)(3), 1798.100 (West 2020). Connecticut requires employers to provide 
prior written notice of the monitoring, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-48d (2020); see Gerardi 
v. City of Bridgeport, 985 A.2d 328, 333–35 (Conn. 2010) (statute prohibited an 
employer from electronically monitoring an employee's activities without prior 
notice). Delaware requires advance written notice which the employee must then 
acknowledge. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 705(b) (2020).
182 Cf. French Workers Get 'Right to Disconnect' from Emails Out of Hours, 
BBC.COM, DEC. 31, 2016, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-38479439; Katie 
Way, Workers of the World, Unplug: The Fight for the ‘Right to Disconnect’, 
VICE.COM (Oct. 16, 2019 2:10 p.m.), https://www.vice.com/en/article/evjk4w/right-to-
disconnect-legislation-labor-movement. 
183 Matthew T. Bodie, The Best Way Out Is Always Through: Changing the 
Employment at-Will Default Rule to Protect Personal Autonomy, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV.
223, 241-58 (2017) (setting forth extant legal protections). Cf. RESTATEMENT OF 
EMPLOYMENT LAW § 7.08 (AM. L. INST. 2015) (proposing a default contractual rule 
against termination for political and ideological beliefs, or lawful conduct).
184 17 U.S.C.A. § 102(a). See Levendowski, supra note 8, at 610.
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apply to extent that these emails were not written within the scope of 
employment, which would otherwise subsume them into the employer’s 
property.185
Copyright’s “work-for-hire” doctrine assumes a clean break between 
one’s work and one’s off-duty time—a break that just isn’t there. The 
assumption then becomes that anything an employee may create that 
correlates in some way to the worker’s job responsibilities is the employer’s 
property. Trade secrets also allocate ideas, concepts, and data over to the 
employer’s side of the ledger.186 Hungry for even more of their employees’ 
output, many companies have drafted broad assignment clauses which 
bolster these existing doctrines through contract. In her book You Don’t Own 
Me, Orly Lobel chronicles the litigation between Mattel and a former 
employee over the right to Bratz Dolls, which were allegedly conceived 
outside of work.187 The employee’s contract required all “inventions” to be 
turned over to Mattel, which “includes, but is not limited to all discoveries, 
improvements, processes, developments, design, know-how, computer data 
programs, and formulae, whether patentable or unpatentable.”188
The dissolution of the barriers between the work self and the private 
self has undone the traditional bargain between employer and employee.
Workers no longer have a sphere where their personal, private, creative 
information belongs to them. The collapse of the distinction has not further 
atomized the players in this game; it has instead facilitated the absorption of 
workers into the economic system. This diffusion of the individual into the 
collective is our second paradigm breakdown.
B. The Embeddedness of the Worker within the Economic Firm
185 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (work-for-hire doctrine).
186 Camilla A. Hrdy & Mark A. Lemley, Abandoning Trade Secrets, 73 STAN. L. REV.
1, 8 (2021) (“It is not uncommon for someone who invented an idea while employed 
at a firm to want to leave and implement the idea herself if the firm won't. But 
currently, it's hard to do that without getting sued.”).
187 ORLY LOBEL, YOU DON’T OWN ME: HOW MATTEL V. MGA ENTERTAINMENT EXPOSED 
BARBIE’S DARK SIDE (2017).
188 Id. at 22-24. The employee’s new company successfully showed that the designs 
had evolved from the employee’s original works while employed. Mattel, Inc., v. 
MGA Entertainment, Inc., 616 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2010).
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Much academic attention has focused on the fissuring of the economic 
firm.189 Advancements in technology, monitoring, and contracting have 
enabled firms to shed employees and instead to purchase labor through 
intermediaries.190 A result—and likely motivation—of such fissuring is the 
displacement of the responsibilities of employment onto other entities.
Mechanisms of fissuring include classifying workers as independent 
contractors, subcontracting out specific aspects of the business to smaller 
firms, and franchising the brand to franchisees.191 These trends seem to signal 
the devolution of the firm and the weakening of its role in the economy.192
But fissuring instead provides an example of how firms can control and 
utilize workers while seemingly cutting them loose. Labor is embedded 
within an economic system that deprives workers of their usual legal 
protections as well as their ability to exercise their individual autonomy. And 
data constructs the web that keeps these workers in place.
To continue with fissuring—it can only happen when employers can 
still exercise the requisite control over the work being done. The economic 
firm is designed to create efficiencies by bringing production under one roof, 
so to speak, rather than leaving it to the vagaries of the market. Ronald Coase 
believed that “[w]e can best approach the question of what constitutes a firm 
in practice by considering the legal relationship normally called that of 
‘master and servant’ or ‘employer and employee.’”193 In Coase’s view, the 
common law “control” test—with its notion of the employer directing the
employee—was the essence of both the legal concept of “employer and 
employee” as well as the economic concept of the firm.194 However, neither
189 See, e.g., DAVID I. WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE (2014).
190 Brishen Rogers, The Law and Political Economy of Workplace Technological 
Change, 55 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 531, 569 (2020).
191 Id. at 569-70.
192 See, e.g., GERALD F. DAVIS, THE VANISHING AMERICAN CORPORATION: NAVIGATING 
THE HAZARDS OF A NEW ECONOMY (2016); June Carbone & Nancy Levit, The Death of 
the Firm, 101 MINN. L. REV. 963 (2017).
193 R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 403 (1937).
194 Id. at 404.
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the legal scope of the firm nor the employer-employee relationship are 
critical if that direction and control can be exercised without them.
Our environment of data-rich communications and analytics enables 
fissuring to proceed apace.195 Firms need not hire employees if independent 
contractors can be nudged, adjusted, and directed by algorithms tracking 
their every move.196 Hotels can hire outside housekeeping contractors and yet 
still ensure that workers are providing high levels of service.197 If the law only
focuses on traditional metrics of employment, such as who pays the worker, 
who directly supervises, who hires and fires, and whether the worker has 
“entrepreneurial opportunities,” the end-user firm will be relieved of 
responsibility.198 But these businesses still have the type of control that is 
necessary to develop and maintain the particular brand experience that is so 
essential within the modern reputation economy.199
Workers find themselves on the wrong end of this data revolution.
They are the producers of data, but the data flows seamlessly from their work 
and personal experience to corporate repositories. Employers can capture the 
data, aggregate it into meaningful pools, analyze it, and use it to further 
productivity. Individual employees cannot tap into that value, nor can 
independent contractors. They are trapped: the more data they provide, the 
more powerful their employers become.
We are waking up to the transfer of power and wealth through the 
aggregation of data in the consumer context. Commentators have exposed 
195 Rogers, supra note 190, at 570 (“If new technologies enable a firm to ensure high-
quality production through suppliers and outside contractors, that firm will have 
incentives to fissure away the work to reduce labor costs.”).
196 MARY L. GRAY & SIDDHARTH SURI, GHOST WORK: HOW TO STOP SILICON VALLEY 
FROM BUILDING A NEW GENERAL UNDERCLASS (2019) (discussing control exercised 
over platform-based workers).
197 WEIL, supra note 189, at 145-46.
198 FedEx Home Delivery v. N.L.R.B., 563 F.3d 492 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (expounding on 
the economic opportunities test for employment).
199 In fact, the brand itself may be the primary or even singular source of value. 
Sonia K. Katyal & Leah Chan Grinvald, Platform Law and the Brand Enterprise, 32 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1135, 1139 (2017) (discussing “the rise of platform economies 
whose sole source of capital inheres in the value of the brand itself—the Airbnbs, 
Ubers, and eBays of the world”).
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the cycle of surveillance capitalism that profiles individual customers and 
then uses those profiles to target us for sales.200 We understand that while 
these innovations have had benefits for consumers, tech companies have 
received extraordinary gains. And our privacy has been grievously 
compromised. Policymakers have begun to explore much more nuanced 
responses that the traditional “notice and consent” approach.201 The California 
Consumer Privacy Act not only provides users explicit opt-out from data 
sales, but also requires data controllers to provide users with their data 
without charge in a format usable by other controllers.202 Portability allows 
users to change companies without losing the benefits of their accumulated 
data over time, whether that be posts, pictures, reputation scores, or 
performance metrics.203 Effectuating portability is easier in theory than in 
practice.204 But at least in the consumer context, efforts to empower 
consumers now address the embeddedness problem, rather than simply 
relying on notice and consent. But we have not reached a similar point with 
respect to employment data.
Intellectual property law similarly ensnares workers within the mesh 
of the economic firm. The assignment of ownership facilitates the 
aggregation of data and the use of that data. When it comes to works of 
200 ZUBOFF, supra note 14.
201 Daniel J. Solove, Introduction: Privacy Self-Management and the Consent 
Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1880 (2013).
202 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100 (“A business that receives a verifiable consumer 
request from a consumer to access personal information shall promptly take steps to 
disclose and deliver, free of charge to the consumer, the personal information 
required by this section. The information may be delivered by mail or electronically, 
and if provided electronically, the information shall be in a portable and, to the 
extent technically feasible, readily useable format that allows the consumer to 
transmit this information to another entity without hindrance.”).
203 Peter Swire & Yianni Lagos, Why the Right to Data Portability Likely Reduces 
Consumer Welfare: Antitrust and Privacy Critique, 72 MD. L. REV. 335, 338 (2013) 
(“[D]ata portability can address a ‘lock-in’ or high switching costs problem--users start 
to use one service, such as Facebook, and then find it costly or technically difficult to 
shift to another service, even if they prefer the other service.”).
204 Engin Bozdag, Data Portability Under GDPR: Technical Challenges, Working 
Paper, January 28, 2018, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3111866.
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artistic expression, employers can rely on the work-for-hire doctrine to 
assimilate the many disparate contributions that go into a film, a website, or a 
media outlet. Even without the benefit of the “work-for-hire” doctrine, firms 
can still capture value from independent contractors through careful 
contracting.205 These assignments facilitate joint creation and distribution, but 
they swallow up individual contributions into an undifferentiated whole.206 In 
terms of data, employers can lock away their troves of employee-generated 
information as trade secrets. The two main criteria for identifying trade 
secrets—that they are valuable and they are kept secret—provide additional 
incentives for firms to hide their data pools.207 State and federal laws have 
reinforced the legal fortress around trade secrets while still not requiring that 
they be registered, identified, or even defined.208 Workers are prohibited from 
taking such information with them and can even be enjoined from working 
elsewhere for fear of inevitable disclosure.209
Employers are also claiming rights over employee experience, know-
how, and judgment—crossing the line between the employment relationship 
and the individual within. Workers may spend many years building up the 
brand for which they labor, but they cannot claim any value over the 
trademark; that belongs exclusively to the employer. The worker’s 
occupational persona is subsumed within the brand.210 Nondisclosure 
agreements can prevent the worker from sharing her personal experiences 
on the job, closing off an avenue of individual expression whether publicly or 
205 Orly Lobel, Gentlemen Prefer Bonds: How Employers Fix the Talent Market, 59 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 663, 681 (2020).
206 This is an overstatement; for example, screenwriters received credit for their work 
through a complex system of credit allocation. CATHERINE L. FISK, WRITING FOR 
HIRE: UNIONS, HOLLYWOOD, AND MADISON AVENUE 144-68 (2016).
207 UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 529 (2005).
208 Hrdy & Lemly, supra note 186.
209 Ryan M. Wiesner, A State-by-State Analysis of Inevitable Disclosure: A Need for 
Uniformity and a Workable Standard, 16 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 211 (2012).
210 See also Marion Crain, Managing Identity: Buying into the Brand at Work, 95 
IOWA L. REV. 1179, 1184 (2010) (“Internal branding programs utilize a coordinated 
hiring, training, disciplinary, and reward structure to imprint brand values upon 
workers' identities and create an emotional connection with the firm so that the 
boundaries between employees' own interests and those of the firm begin to blur.”).
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privately.211 Covenants not to complete and their associated cadre of 
noncompetition clauses foreclose the exploration of opportunities outside the 
firm and further limit worker efforts to exercise autonomy in the economic 
sphere.212
The concentration of intellectual property rights within a firm makes 
some economic sense. Joint production can be impossible without a central 
rights-holder to manage the process. Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz 
conjectured that the purpose of the firm was not to control, but rather to 
manage a diverse set of contributions that are difficult to compare or 
segregate.213 Under their theory, team production is “production in which 1) 
several types of resources are used and 2) the product is not a sum of 
separable outputs of each cooperating resource.”214 An independent 
monitor—the firm—would insure that the team members all contribute 
appropriately and are rewarded appropriately.215 The difficulty here is that 
firms are not accountable to those who provide the labor. The result is that
firms capture the value provided by employees while remaining 
unaccountable to them for that value.216
Worker data is valuable. But existing legal regimes facilitate the 
disconnection of employees from their data in its collection, aggregation, and 
use. Most employers have enjoyed almost unlimited authority in their control 
and profit from the new data economy. In some circumstances, however, 
211 Lobel, supra note 205, at 681 (discussing how NDAs can expand “beyond the 
traditional categories of trade secrets, include general know-how, client lists, and 
salary information”).
212 Lobel, supra note 131, at 824-34.
213 Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 119, at 777-78.
214 Id. at 779.
215 Id. at 782–83.
216 See Dan L. Burk & Brett H. McDonnell, The Goldilocks Hypothesis: Balancing 
Intellectual Property Rights at the Boundary of the Firm, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 575, 
635 (2007) (“We have seen why the law might best assign [intellectual property] 
rights to firms in such circumstances. However, this leaves employees open to 
exploitation, so that the opposite assignment might be better. Even if assigning 
rights to the firm is best, it is possible that protection of employees then requires 
assigning more power to employees within firms than we observe.”).
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workers have overcome the default distribution to play a larger role in data 
processing and collect more of its rewards. We turn next to examples of both.
C. The Digital Divide: Platform Drivers and Professional Athletes
Worker efforts to disentangle themselves from their economic and 
legal systems and regain some control over their data may appear hopeless.
There is a sense of doom, of resignation, in reflections on the declining 
expectations of privacy and the powerlessness of employees to resist it.217 This 
despair is warranted considering the technological advances that facilitate 
privacy compromise and value displacement. But some workers have 
managed to harness, if not fully capture, the ways in which data can be used 
to enhance workplace productivity.
Most workers are not in that position. Employers have largely been left 
to their own devices to collect and use employment data as they see fit. The 
platform ride-sharing companies such as Uber and Lyft represent an extreme 
version of this relationship. These companies have come as close as possible 
to distilling their core businesses down to big data operations.218 They pitch 
themselves as technology companies or platform providers, not 
transportation service providers.219 The data relationship forms a cycle: the 
companies collect information from the drivers and passengers, and then the 
companies use that information to set prices and incentivize drivers to meet 
217 Ajunwa, Crawford & Schultz, supra note 18, at 776 (noting that workplace 
surveillance innovations “have decimated worker privacy”); J.S. Nelson, 
Management Culture and Surveillance, 43 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 631, 635 (2020) 
(discussing “how much more invasive technological surveillance has become”).
218 ALEX ROSENBLAT, UBERLAND: HOW ALGORITHMS ARE REWRITING THE WORLD OF 
WORK 3 (2018) (“At its core, Uber does one thing really well: it organizes work for 
drivers and rides for passengers through its smartphone app.”).
219 Joel Rosenblatt, Uber's Future May Depend On Convincing the World Drivers 
Aren’t Part of its 'Core Business,’ TIME (Sept. 12, 2019 9:37 AM EDT), 
https://time.com/5675637/uber-business-future/ (“’Drivers’ work is outside the usual 
course of Uber’s business, which is serving as a technology platform for several 
different types of digital marketplaces,’ Tony West, the company’s chief legal officer, 
said in an interview with reporters Wednesday.’).
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3819897
THE LAW OF EMPLOYEE DATA: PRIVACY, PROPERTY, GOVERNANCE
46
passenger needs. The process is all managed by sophisticated algorithms that 
feed on massive amounts of data.220
Platform companies garner a vast trove of data from their workforce.
They track location data to deploy drivers who are closest to customers.221 But 
along with tracking locations, the companies provide directions to drivers,
and they track how effective those directions are over time.222 In fact, Uber 
has been known to designate a certain ride for exploration in which the driver 
takes a less-traveled route to “map” that possibility for the machine.223 This is 
just one example of the ways in which platform companies may manipulate 
drivers and customers by implying something about the data that just isn’t 
there.224 The companies also track other types of data about drivers, including 
reputation scores from customers,225 how long drivers are idle without 
engaging in a compensated ride,226 and even the physical stability of the 
phone within the car.227 Drivers must put their trust in the companies to 
manage this data, despite failures in security.228
Although drivers build this system with their data, they find 
themselves disempowered through their data relationship. Information is 
collected by the platform companies and largely disappears from individual 
220 ROSENBLAT, supra note 218, at 3 (“Rather than supervising its hundreds of 
thousands of drivers with human supervisors, the company has built a ride-sharing 
platform on a system of algorithms that serves as a virtual ‘automated manager.’”).
221 Id.
222 Id. at 132.
223 Id. at 133.
224 Id. at 114-25 (discussing examples); see also Sarah Mason, High Score, Low Pay: 
Why the Gig Economy Loves Gamification, GUARDIAN, Nov. 20, 2018, 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2018/nov/20/high-score-low-pay-gamification-
lyft-uber-drivers-ride-hailing-gig-economy (discussing how Lyft motivates drivers 
through gamification).
225 Id. at 149-56.
226 Sarah Holder, For Ride-Hailing Drivers, Data Is Power, BLOOMBERG CITYLAB, Aug. 
22, 2019, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-08-22/why-uber-drivers-are-
fighting-for-their-data. 
227 ROSENBLAT, supra note 218, at 141-42.
228 Id. at 163-64.
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drivers’ purview.229 Meanwhile, the platform companies use algorithms to 
manage drivers and provide only automated and inexpensive technical or 
managerial assistance.230 So the process is dehumanizing in two respects: 
workers not only interact primarily with an algorithm that controls their 
daily experience, but their own data is the raw material that builds and 
sustains that algorithm. It is a black box that the workers create but have no 
control over or institutional connection to.
Lack of driver power within the data relationship has motivated efforts 
to change the equation. Drivers in the United Kingdom have asserted their 
rights to obtain and manage their data under the General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR), a European Union privacy regulation that went into 
effect in 2018.231 In particular, they want data portability—a right under the 
GDPR—to obtain their data for their own purposes.232 In the United States, 
the Driver’s Seat Cooperative provides an app allowing drivers to turn on a 
GPS system that runs in the background while they work, recording their 
location.233 The Cooperative plans to aggregate, anonymize, and share the 
data with participating drivers.234 If drivers do not obtain some level of 
control over either their data or the platform companies themselves, they 
may find themselves out of work altogether, as the companies are using this 
data to build systems with self-driving cars.235 The drivers are supplying the 
raw materials for this new automated system through their data—their 
labor—without any stake in its future success.
229 Holder, supra note 226 (quoting a drivers as to his efforts to get his data to “assert 
my rights and eliminate the asymmetry in information power between me and 
Uber”).
230 DANIEL LYONS, LAB RATS: HOW SILICON VALLEY MADE WORK MISERABLE FOR THE 
REST OF US 150 (2018); ROSENBLAT, supra note 218, at 144.
231 Holder, supra note 226; Uber Drivers Demand Their Data, ECONOMIST, MAR. 20,
2019, https://www.economist.com/britain/2019/03/20/uber-drivers-demand-their-data.
232 Id.
233 Holder, supra note 226.
234 Id.
235 Kirsten Korosec, Lyft Is Using Data from its Rideshare Drivers to Develop Self-
Driving Cars, TECHCRUNCH.COM (June 23, 2020, 10:51 AM CDT),
https://techcrunch.com/2020/06/23/lyft-is-using-data-from-its-ride-share-drivers-to-
develop-self-driving-cars/. 
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More data is likely collected from professional athletes than any other 
occupation. “People analytics” began in baseball in 1859 with the first box 
score.236 Ever since, professional athletes have been observed in every aspect 
of their performance on the field.237 The Moneyball phenomenon brought 
new sets of data and data analytics to the evaluation of players, and the search 
for untapped information continues apace.238 Player movements are 
chronicled with video recordings that capture 25 frames per second.239 New 
statistics are constantly developed to capture all aspects of performance.240
But the search for performance metrics has long since moved beyond what 
happens on the court or field. Monitoring now goes on 24 hours a day.241 The 
types of data are staggering: body and eye movements, elbow stress, skin 
temperature, heart rate, oxygen levels, glucose levels, hydration, sleep 
236 Mike Pesca, The Man Who Made Baseball's Box Score a Hit, NPR.ORG, July 30, 
2009, https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=106891539.
237 Former professional quarterback Peyton Manning lampooned the extreme fan 
attention given to players’ performance in his “Cut that meat!” ad. Steve Gardner, 
Peyton Manning's Top 10 TV Commercials in Honor of His 44th Birthday, USA
TODAY (Mar. 24, 2020 7:30 A.M. ET), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nfl/2020/03/24/peyton-manning-10-best-tv-
commercials-nfl-nationwide-espn/2903386001/.
238 LEWIS, supra note 33; Terrance F. Ross, Welcome to Smarter Basketball, 
ATLANTIC, June 25, 2015, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2015/06/nba-data-
analytics/396776/ (“Every micro-movement on the court could now be tracked, 
quantified, and eventually archived. No longer could a player ‘hide’ his deficiencies 
on the court.”).
239 Ken Berger, Warriors 'Wearable' Weapon? Devices to Monitor Players While on 
the Court, CBS SPORTS, (June 3, 2015, 7:41 A.M. ET), 
https://www.cbssports.com/nba/news/warriors-wearable-weapon-devices-to-monitor-
players-while-on-the-court/. 
240 The NBA’s Adam Silver: How Analytics Is Transforming Basketball, 
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON, June 1, 2017, 
https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/nbas-adam-silver-analytics-
transforming-basketball/ (discussing efforts to record assists of assists).
241 Id. (“At night, most players wear sleep monitors.”).
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rhythms.242 The avalanche of data techniques and analytics has led to the 
“hyperquantified athlete.”243
These immersive levels of surveillance create the impression that 
these workers are trapped in a dystopian, Orwellian environment. And to be 
sure, players have chafed at the invasiveness of many protocols.244 But in 
looking at the bigger picture, professional athletes have facilitated the use of 
their data in ways that inure to their benefit. To begin with, they are 
extremely well-compensated. The minimum salaries in the four major men’s 
sports leagues are all in the range of a half-million dollars and accelerate 
quickly thereafter.245 The interest in data reflects the money generated by 
professional sports, and players have managed to secure a significant chunk 
of that revenue. Because all four major leagues are unionized, players also 
have a collective voice to negotiate the methods, manner, and scope of data 
collection by the teams.246 There is some concern that the players’ unions 
have not kept up with the latest developments in data collection, particularly 
242 Nick Busca, As Biometrics Boom, Who Owns Athletes’ Data? It Depends on the 
Sport., WASH. POST (Feb. 2, 2021 7:00 A.M. CST), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/2021/02/02/athletes-biometrics-data-privacy/; 
Travis Sawchik, Pirates Look to Create, Measure Optimum Performance, 
PITTSBURGH TRIB., July 16, 2016, https://archive.triblive.com/sports/pirates/pirates-
look-to-create-measure-optimum-performance/ (discussing the Omega Wave 
technology); Oura Partners With WNBA for 2020 Season, BUSINESSWIRE.COM (July 
30, 2020 9:00 a.m.), 
https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20200730005532/en/%C2%A0Oura-
Partners-With-WNBA-for-2020-Season.
243 David Jarvis, Kevin Wescott & Dan Jones, The Hyperquantified Athlete: 
Technology, Measurement, and the Business of Sports, in DELOITTE INSIGHTS:
TECHNOLOGY, MEDIA, AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS PREDICTIONS 2021 (2020),
file:///C:/Users/sambl/Downloads/DI_2021-TMT-predictions.pdf. 
244 Rian Wyatt, New Technologies Are Forcing Baseball To Balance Big Data With 
"Big Brother,” VICE (May 27, 2016 9:20 A.M.), 
https://www.vice.com/en/article/8qygbp/new-technologies-are-forcing-baseball-to-
balance-big-data-with-big-brother. 
245 Connor Fleming, How Do The Minimum MLS And NWSL Salaries Compare To 
Other U.S. Sports?, THE18.COM, Feb. 6, 2019, https://the18.com/en/soccer-
entertainment/minimum-salary-in-pro-sports. 
246 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (setting forth the duty to bargain).
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with respect to health data.247 But worker data falls under the terms and 
conditions of employment, which means the leagues must bargain with the 
unions about them.248 Collective bargaining agreements in professional 
sports provide players with control and ownership over certain kinds of 
data.249 In addition, individual players have significant ownership rights over 
the uses of their names and likenesses. Although the leagues have the power 
to make collective agreements over their use, players retain significant 
individual rights to participate in advertisements, endorsements, and other 
opportunities to trade on their individual and team success.250
Even with their individual and collective market power, athletes are 
still pressing for stronger rights over their data. Many teams make data 
analytics innovations voluntary on the part of the player, but collective 
bargaining agreements could be stricter on their use and could forbid the 
more invasive technologies.251 Players have also banded together to seek 
control and ownership of their data outside the collective-bargaining context.
In the United Kingdom, Project Red Card seeks to reclaim rights over player 
statistics from the many outside analysts and gambling agencies that process 
that data for their own economic benefit.252 These athletes claim that the 
GDPR renders the processing illegal without their consent.253
247 Skyler R. Berman, Bargaining Over Biometrics: How Player Unions Should 
Protect Athletes in the Age of Wearable Technology, 85 BROOK. L. REV. 543, 545
(2020).
248 See NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958) (explain 
the difference between mandatory and permissive subjects of collective bargaining).
249 Busca, supra note 242.
250 Perhaps the most important publicity-rights case involved baseball cards. Haelan 
Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953).
251 Berman, supra note 247, at 545-46.
252 Nick Hartley & Philip Marsh, Russell Slade: Ex-Manager Leads Lawsuit over use 
of Players' Personal Data, BBC.COM, July 28, 2020, 
https://www.bbc.com/sport/football/53557706; David Ornstein, Players to Sue for 
Hundreds of Millions over Use of Their Statistics, ATHLETIC, July 26, 2020, 
https://theathletic.com/1949883/.
253 Hartley & Marsh, supra note 252 (“Using the requirements placed by the General 
Data Protection Regulations brought in in 2018, players will claim that they have 
neither given consent, nor received the chance to change data they feel 
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Even with these concerns, data analytics are not necessarily viewed by 
athletes solely as a burden to bear. Players in less well-funded leagues see the 
absence of analytics as problematic and want their leagues to invest in 
them.254 After all, the purpose of these analytics is generally to improve the 
players’ performance, maximize playing ability, and prevent injury.255 These 
technologies can make players safer and healthier, stronger and swifter, 
smarter and savvier. They should be a win-win. But players need voice and 
power to avoid the opportunistic and voyeuristic aspects of monitoring 
regimes controlled exclusively by employers.
The examples of ride-sharing drivers and professional athletes show 
that concerns about the collection and use of worker data do not simply fall 
along a metric from more invasive to less invasive. The nature and scope of 
the data processing matter, but so do the purposes of the processing and the 
worker control and ownership over it. If workers can participate in the design 
of the data program, object when it goes too far, and then better themselves
through the program, then data analytics is a positive development. These 
principles should guide us as we reimagine the legal regime for all workers.
IV. A NEW REGIME FOR WORKER DATA: PRIVACY, PROPERTY, AND GOVERNANCE
Traditional paradigms within the employment relationship are 
breaking down. Lines are blurring between personal and business-related, and 
between worker and firm. Existing regimes of legal categorization and 
calibration no longer hold (if they ever really did). We need to rethink our 
approach to employee data and our regulation of the relationship between 
misrepresents them, nor have they been given the chance to be either reimbursed 
for their use or taken out of it entirely—all staples of the GDPR rules.”).
254 See Taylor Soper, Basketball Legend Sue Bird on the Data Disparity between 
Men’s and Women’s Sports, GEEKWIRE.COM (March 16, 2016, 4:14 A.M.), 
https://www.geekwire.com/2016/basketball-legend-sue-bird-data-disparity-mens-
womens-sports/. 
255 Ron Miller, NFL-AWS Partnership Hopes to Reduce Head Injuries with Machine
Learning, TECHCRUNCH.COM (Dec. 5, 2019 4:24 PM CST), 
https://techcrunch.com/2019/12/05/nfl-aws-partnership-hopes-to-reduce-head-injuries-
with-machine-learning/.
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worker and firm. This Part will explore three potential avenues for adapting 
to the new environment: (a) creating a hybrid approach to employee data 
regulation, melding aspects of both privacy law and property law; (b) 
recognizing employers as information fiduciaries with respect to employee 
data; and (c) providing for worker participation in the firm’s informational 
governance.
A. A Hybrid Approach to the Privacy/Property Conundrum
The collection and use of employee data falls under two distinct U.S. 
legal regimes: privacy and property. Privacy protections generally apply to an 
employee’s non-public, personal data, such as health and biometrics, personal 
communications, and political or religious beliefs. But such protections can 
also apply, to a very limited extent, within the workplace itself. In contrast, 
instances of employee data creation that can be categorized as property are 
assigned to the firm. Both systems cover information that is “related to” the 
employee but provide sharply different ways of regulating its use.
The best way forward as to all varieties of employee data is to blend 
the privacy and property approaches—something that individual legal 
doctrines themselves often do.256 A hybrid approach to employee data 
protection recognizes that employees have continuing interests in the use of 
their data. In some situations, they will want to shield the data from further 
disclosure or analysis. In other situations, they will want credit for the data 
and a chance to participate in its continuing creation of value.257 But these 
interests are not an either/or switch. Information that is traditionally 
considered personal may have value to the business, and creative expressions 
256 See, e.g.., Daniel A. Crane, Intellectual Liability, 88 TEX. L. REV. 253, 255 (2009) 
(examining whether intellectual property regimes are truly “property” or rather a 
hybrid form of property and liability).
257 One example of continuing interests in property, even after it is no longer owned 
by the individual, is the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (VARA), 17 U.S.C. § 106A 
(2000). VARA provides visual artists with three “moral” rights over their art: the 
right of integrity to prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or other 
modification;” the right of attribution; and the right to prevent the destruction of 
works of visual art that are “of recognized stature.” Id. For an argument against such 
rights, see Amy M. Adler, Against Moral Rights, 97 CAL. L. REV. 263, 300 (2009).
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or personal identity may need ongoing privacy protections against intrusions.
A regulatory regime that melds aspects of privacy law and intellectual 
property law—for employee data as a whole—is necessary in the information 
economy.
A system constructed purely around privacy regulation fails to 
account for the unique features of the employment relationship. Privacy law 
focuses on the collection of information and imposes legal barriers to access 
when physical or electronic barriers fail.258 The traditional common-law 
intrusion tort largely imagines an invasion from the outside—a 
nonconsensual violation.259 But there are steady and significant flows between 
employers and employees covering a wide variety of information. Even the 
disclosure of extremely private information can at times be necessary.260 It is 
hard to find absolutes here.261 And it is inappropriate to borrow too much 
from consumer privacy regimes; although consumers may have ongoing 
data relationships, the information flow is generally not as thick and constant 
as between employee and employer.
Property rights are meant to be more concrete and definable, as 
compared to privacy.262 The property has an owner, and that owner has 
certain rights over the property regarding its use. This clarity is invaluable 
when it comes to real property, as parties and courts need to know who has 
the right to use, exclude, and sell.263 In the context of the employment 
relationship, however, this move towards enclosure creates difficulties.
258 RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 7.03 (AM. LAW INST. 2015).
259 RESTATEMENT SECOND OF TORTS § 652B (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
260 For an extreme example, see Feminist Women's Health Ctr. v. Superior Court, 52 
Cal. App. 4th 1234 (1997).
261 Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 562 (2006) 
(“Protecting privacy requires careful balancing, as neither privacy nor its 
countervailing interests are absolute values.”).
262 See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 87, at 253 (“Privacy is considered a vague and 
protean concept.”).
263 See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating 
Entitlements in Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1793–94 (2007). But this clarity can 
be overstated. See, e.g., LEE ANNE FENNELL, SLICES & LUMPS: DIVISION AND 
AGGREGATION IN LAW AND LIFE (2019) (discussing different aggregations of property 
rights).
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Property law allows one party—almost always the employer—to claim 
exclusive rights over the information. In all areas of intellectual property—
trademark, copyright, patent, trade secrets, and publicity—businesses are 
aggressively asserting their rights over employees and capturing all of the 
economic value from this jointly-contributed resource.
The strengths and weakness of these approaches has played out in the 
larger struggles over the management of personal data. Some commentators 
have proposed a system of property rights in data in order to give their 
creators more control over its use as well as an opportunity to participate in 
the value that their data creates.264 However, reception to this idea has largely 
been negative.265 Property rights would (further) restrict the free flow of 
information, inhibiting the spread of knowledge and understanding.266 If the 
rights were alienable, personal data could easily come under the control of 
another—in our case, the employer.267 If inalienable, they would allow for the 
264 See, e.g., Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV.
2055, 2056 (2004). (“This Article develops the five critical elements of a model for 
propertized personal information that would help fashion a market that would 
respect individual privacy and help maintain a democratic order. These five 
elements are: limitations on an individual's right to alienate personal information; 
default rules that force disclosure of the terms of trade; a right of exit for 
participants in the market; the establishment of damages to deter market abuses; 
and institutions to police the personal information market and punish privacy 
violations.”); A. Michael Froomkin, The Constitution and Encryption Regulation: Do 
We Need a “New Privacy” ?, 3 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL. 25, 34 (1999) (suggesting 
an intellectual property model for data privacy).
265 Amy Kapczynski, The Law of Informational Capitalism, 129 YALE L.J. 1460, 1501 
(2020) (“Intellectual-property scholars have, for the most part, argued vociferously 
against any form of property protection in personal data for a variety of reasons, 
including concerns about transaction costs and innovation.”).
266 See Lothar Determann, No One Owns Data, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 5 (2018) (“New 
property rights in data are not suited to promote better privacy or more innovation 
or technological advances, but would more likely suffocate free speech, information 
freedom, science, and technological progress.”). 
267 See ROTHMAN, supra note 152, at 136-37 (discussing the dangers of the right to 
sell one’s right of publicity); Pamela Samuelson, Privacy As Intellectual Property?, 
52 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1171 (2000) (“Also mismatched are traditional policies of 
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creation of an anticommons.268 Any such regime would also raise significant
logistical issues269 and free speech concerns.270
Separating out individualized data property cuts against the purpose of 
the firm—namely, to enable joint production. Firms are used when joint 
production facilitates productivity.271 The participants in this unit—the firm—
have cast their lots together to engage in economic activity that would 
otherwise be extremely difficult to tease out into separate contracts. Because 
these players are all working together, they are treated as a unit for certain 
property law favoring free alienability and information privacy policy preferences 
for restrictions on alienation.”).
268 See Mark A. Lemley, Private Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1545, 1550 (2000) 
(“Ownership rights presumably will have to exist in bits of data, so we might want to 
grant individuals ownership over even seemingly innocuous bits of data which 
might be aggregated later on. But the more broadly we define the right, the more we 
will interfere with everyday commerce.“); Jane Yakowitz, Tragedy of the Data 
Commons, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 2 (2011) (discussing the benefits to research 
from a data commons). On the anticommons, see Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of 
the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L.
REV. 621, 624 (1998) (“In an anticommons, by my definition, multiple owners are 
each endowed with the right to exclude others from a scarce resource, and no one 
has an effective privilege of use. When there are too many owners holding rights of 
exclusion, the resource is prone to underuse—a tragedy of the anticommons.”).
269 Determann, supra note 266, at 5 (“[T]here is much uncertainty and ambiguity 
regarding the meaning of ‘data,’ ‘information,’ and ‘ownership;’ little comprehensive 
analysis regarding how existing properly laws already cover data or exclude data 
from protection; and relatively sparse considerations of legal and policy reasons for 
not granting properly rights to data.”).
270 See Jane Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 57, 60 (2014) (“When the 
government deliberately interferes with an individual's effort to learn something 
new, that suppression of disfavored knowledge is presumptively illegitimate and 
must withstand judicial scrutiny.”); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and 
Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People from 
Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049 (2000).
271 Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 119, at 780.
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purposes.272 The coordinating aspects of firm production allow for the whole 
to be greater than the sum of the parts.273
This unique informational relationship calls for a hybrid approach.
The foundations of such an approach would have three characteristics. First, 
employees would have ongoing rights in their data even after providing it to 
the employer. These rights would be similar to those provided under the 
European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).274 The rights 
include:
272 Guy Davidov has recognized that the concept of employee requires a governance 
structure (such as a firm) outside of the market. He argues that structure is necessary 
as “a direct result of two combined factors: first, our inclination to join forces and work 
together with others; and second, the need to coordinate production to an extent that 
the market cannot satisfy.” Guy Davidov, The Three Axes of Employment 
Relationships: A Characterization of Workers in Need of Protection, 52 U. TORONTO 
L.J. 357, 377-78 (2002).
273 Indeed, the data itself may the production of the team members as a group, even 
if it involves data related to individual members of the team. As Amy Kapczynski 
has elaborated: 
The tendency instead to see data as a thing that springs from a person 
and that enters the world as a transcendent object misapprehends 
what data is and obscures how it came to serve as a critical form of 
capital in the current age. This view of data—rather like the view of 
commodities of which Marx once wrote—imbues it with a kind of 
religious aura, treating “productions of the human brain” as if they 
are “autonomous figures endowed with a life of their own, which 
enter into relations both with each other and with the human race.” If 
we are to intervene to democratize private power today, we must 
instead understand data (and by extension, information and 
knowledge) as the product of social relations and so properly the 
object of social interest. And we must understand how law helps to 
construct data, and data as capital, by shaping these social relations.
Kapczynski, supra note 265, at 1499 (footnotes omitted).
274 Regulation 2016/679, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 
2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal 
Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC, 
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• A right to be notified about data collection (Article 12); 
• A right to access and review one’s data (Article 15);
• A right to correct erroneous data (Article 16);
• A right to have irrelevant or misleading data deleted (Article 17);
• A right to restrict use of the data to the purpose for which it was 
originally collected or provided, unless further consent is provided 
(Article 5); and
• A right of portability—the ability to obtain and take one’s data from 
the employer (Article 20).275
These rights do not require “privacy” in the traditional American sense of 
fencing off certain information from access.276 Rather, they are rights to 
control the use of one’s data even after it is in another’s hands.277 These are 
exactly the kinds of rights that employees need when they have an interest in 
providing the data but also an interest in the use thereafter.
Arts. 1, 9 (General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119) (EU) [hereinafter 
GDPR]. An easily accessible version of the GDPR can be found at: Intersoft 
Consulting, GDPR, https://gdpr-info.eu/.
275 Id.
276 The GDPR protects against inappropriate data collection through Article 6, which 
requires a specific justification for any “processing,” which would include collection.
GDPR, supra note 274, Art. 6. Consent is one such justification. However, the GDPR 
has essentially said that consent cannot be trusted in the employer-employee 
relationship because of the power imbalance between the parties. Id., Recital 42(1) 
(discussing the employment relationship as an example of “a clear imbalance 
between the data subject and the controller” under which consent is suspect).
Acknowledging the need for data processing within the employment relationship, 
GDPR guidance indicates that much of such processing will be justified either as 
necessary to the relationship or as an appropriate balance between the interests of 
the parties. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 2/2017 on Data 
Processing at Work, 17/EN WP 249, at 6-8 (June 8, 2017), 
http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/document.cfm?doc_id=45631. 
277 Jacob M. Victor, The EU General Data Protection Regulation: Toward A Property 
Regime for Protecting Data Privacy, 123 YALE L.J. 513, 516 (2013) (“The draft 
Regulation seems to transcend this debate by adapting the rights and remedies 
commonly associated with property in service of a human-rights-driven approach to 
privacy.”).
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Second, employees should also have ongoing rights over the value 
generated by the data use. In particular, additional or unexpected income 
from the use of the data should not be expropriated without some system of 
sharing. There are reports of employers bundling and selling employee data 
to third parties for uses unassociated with joint production.278 These sales 
should be prohibited without employee consent, and employers should be 
prohibited from punishing workers who refuse to give their consent for 
resale.
Third, protections would kick in against employer’s collection or use of 
data that transgressed societal norms of dignity and decency.279 There is still 
plenty of information that employees wish to keep out of the hands of their 
managers and co-workers. Traditional tort law can continue to police these 
boundaries, but a broader federal law with more clarity as to scope would be a 
welcome development.280 Regardless, we can no longer expect traditional 
privacy protections against information collection to do all the work for us 
when it comes to employee data. Instead, we should recognize that employees 
have ongoing privacy and (quasi-)property rights in their data, and that the 
law should recast itself accordingly.
B. Employers as Information Fiduciaries
Another way to regulate the collection and use of employment data 
would be a more rigorous set of employer duties concerning the stewardship 
of this data. The law already has a method for placing heightened 
responsibilities on actors for the care of others: fiduciaries. When exercising
control or possession over things that belong to another, a fiduciary has 
heighted obligations to care for those things and not to betray the trust of the 
owner.281 Courts and commentators have characterized the exercise of control 
278 Adler-Bell & Miller, supra note 15.
279 See, e.g., Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REV.
119, 138 (2004) (arguing that privacy protections serve to enforce norms of 
information appropriateness and norms of information flow or distribution).
280 Ajunwa, Crawford & Schultz, supra note 18, at 773-75.
281 Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 1183, 1207 (2016) (“A fiduciary is one who has special obligations of loyalty 
and trustworthiness toward another person.”).
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by the fiduciary in different but related ways: the ability of the fiduciary to 
exercise discretion in carrying out its tasks;282 the vulnerability of the 
beneficiary to the fiduciary’s exercise of power and potential opportunism;283
the trust and confidence reposed in the fiduciary by the beneficiary;284 and 
reasonable expectations of the parties.285 The employment relationship fits 
282 Zastrow v. Journal Commc'ns, Inc., 718 N.W.2d 51, 59 (Wis. 2006) (“A consistent 
facet of a fiduciary duty is the constraint on the fiduciary's discretion to act in his 
own self-interest because by accepting the obligation of a fiduciary he consciously 
sets another's interests before his own.”); Paul B. Miller, A Theory of Fiduciary 
Liability, 56 MCGILL L.J. 235, 262 (2011) (describing a fiduciary relationship as “one 
in which one party (the fiduciary) enjoys discretionary power over the significant 
practical interests of another (the beneficiary)”); D. Gordon Smith, The Critical 
Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399, 1402 (2002) (“[F]iduciary 
relationships form when one party (the ‘fiduciary’) acts on behalf of another party 
(the ‘beneficiary’) while exercising discretion with respect to a critical resource 
belonging to the beneficiary.”); see also D. Gordon Smith & Jordan C. Lee, Fiduciary 
Discretion, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 609, 644 (2014) (“The most commonly cited scholarly 
works in the canon of fiduciary law emphasize the importance of discretion in 
fiduciary relationships.”)..
283 Burdett v. Miller, 957 F.2d 1375, 1381 (7th Cir. 1992) (“The common law imposes 
that [fiduciary] duty when the disparity between the parties in knowledge or power 
relevant to the performance of an undertaking is so vast that it is a reasonable 
inference that had the parties in advance negotiated expressly over the issue they 
would have agreed that the agent owed the principal the high duty that we have 
described, because otherwise the principal would be placing himself at the agent's 
mercy.”).
284 Wiener v. Lazard Freres & Co., 672 N.Y.S.2d 8, 14 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (inquiring 
as to whether one party “reposed confidence in another and reasonably relied on the 
other’s superior expertise and knowledge”).
285 Deborah A. DeMott, Relationships of Trust and Confidence in the Workplace, 100 
CORNELL L. REV. 1255, 1261 (2015) (finding that “courts impose ad hoc or fact-based 
fiduciary duties when although the parties' relationship was not categorically 
fiduciary, its characteristics nonetheless justified one party's expectation of loyal 
conduct from the other”).
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these justifications across the sweep of the relationship.286 But the designation 
applies even more accurately with respect to employee data.
The notion of information fiduciaries has a somewhat hoary 
provenance but is also a relative recent policy innovation.287 Like other 
fiduciaries, the information fiduciary has special responsibilities to 
individuals for whom the fiduciary holds or controls something of special 
value. But in this case, the thing of special value is information.288 Many 
professionals who keep their clients’ information confidential, such as doctors 
and lawyers, are essentially information fiduciaries in the course of their 
relationship with their clients.289 Because these relationships involve the 
collection, analysis, use, and disclosure of sensitive information, the 
information fiduciaries must not use information obtained in the course of 
the relationship “in ways that harm or undermine the principal, patient, or 
client, or create conflicts of interest with the principal, patient, or client.”290
Employers are an ideal match with the concept of information 
fiduciaries. The use of worker data is multifaceted: sometimes it is kept 
private from all but a few other employees; other times it is shared within the 
286 See Matthew T. Bodie, Employment as Fiduciary Relationship, 105 GEO. L.J. 819, 
854-62 (2017).
287 See Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries in the Digital Age, BALKINIZATION 
(Mar. 5, 2014, 4:50 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/03/information-fiduciaries-
in-digital-age.html (developing the idea of an “information fiduciary” and discussing 
how the concept is reflected in existing fiduciary law). See also Lina M. Khan & 
David E. Pozen, A Skeptical View of Information Fiduciaries, 133 HARV. L. REV. 497, 
499 (2019) (discussing how Kenneth Laudon appears to have coined the term in 
1990). For an alternative approach based on the duty of loyalty, see Neil Richards & 
Woodrow Hartzog, A Duty of Loyalty for Privacy Law, Working Paper, (July 3, 2020), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3642217 (setting out a theory of loyalty based upon “the 
risks of digital opportunism in information relationships”).
288 Balkin, supra note 281, at 1209 (“An information fiduciary is a person or business 
who, because of their relationship with another, has taken on special duties with 
respect to the information they obtain in the course of the relationship.”). 
289 Id.
290 Id. Interestingly, Balkin mentions vulnerability related to data collected by 
Uber—but he is concerned primarily not with employees, but with customers. Id. at 
1187-91.
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firm; and sometimes it is used by the firm in its relationships with suppliers, 
customers, and even society. The employer uses its discretion in processing
this information; employees are vulnerable to the employer’s use of the data 
and to potential opportunism; employees have trust and confidence in the 
employer to use the data appropriately; and the parties reasonably expect this 
to be the case. Employers exercise discretion over the employees’ practical 
interests and critical resources—namely, their data.291
Some commentators have argued for a more contractual approach to 
information protection, noting that if parties want one party to have duties 
over the information, they can contract for confidentiality.292 But if fiduciary 
duties could be handled purely by contract, we would have no need for them.
Employees owe fiduciary duties to employers in addition to their contractual 
responsibilities because the employer cannot dictate every aspect of the job in 
the contract.293 The relationship is similarly incomplete from the employees’ 
perspective; with regard to employee data, the employer’s use of that data 
cannot be reduced to specific contractual provisions at the outset of the 
relationship.294 Given the resulting incompleteness, fiduciary duties are 
justified to balance out the expectations of the parties and prevent 
opportunism.295 Moreover, individual employees lack the legal understanding 
and bargaining strength to negotiate for the appropriate level of protections.
291 Smith, supra note 282, at 1402.
292 Volokh, supra note 270, at 1051; cf. Larry E. Ribstein, Fencing Fiduciary Duties, 91 
B.U. L. REV. 899, 900 (2011) (“[T]he fiduciary duty is most usefully viewed as a type of 
contract.”).
293 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. g (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (“As 
agents, all employees owe duties of loyalty to their employers.”).
294 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Participatory Management Within a Theory of the Firm, 
21 J. CORP. L. 657, 664 (1996) (“Because employees and employers cannot execute a 
complete contract under conditions of uncertainty and complexity, many decisions 
must be left for later contractual rewrites imposed by employer fiat.”); Kent 
Greenfield, The Place of Workers in Corporate Law, 39 B.C. L. REV. 283, 317 (1998) 
(“Workers and management thus face significant barriers to contracting, in that they 
face huge transaction costs in reducing to writing all the implicit understandings 
necessary to reach the outcome best for both parties.”).
295 See Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429, 438 (1987) (“Employment creates 
occasions for opportunism.”).
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Employee consent to the employers’ terms—which often include duties of 
confidentiality, nonsolicitation agreements, and covenants not to compete—
cannot be taken as a true indicia of the fairness of the underlying contract.296
The concept of an information fiduciary recognizes that “certain kinds 
of information constitute matters of private concern not because of their 
content, but because of the social relationships that produce them.”297 The 
exact nature of the duties imposed upon employers as information fiduciaries 
would be open to further development.298 The critical notion would be one of 
protection: employers would be prohibited from using employee data to 
harm them opportunistically.299 The relationship is a complicated one, and we 
should acknowledge that employees are “information fiduciaries” for the 
employer as well.300 Fortunately for employers, an array of intellectual 
property protections, especially trade secret law, step in to protect them 
against unfair employee opportunism.301 Workers need a counterbalance on 
the other side—a recognition of the responsibilities that their companies 
must accept as part of the employment relationship.
C. Worker Participation in Informational Governance
296 The GDPR understands this power imbalance and will largely not see employee 
consent as sufficient to justify the processing of workplace data. GDPR, supra note 
274, Art. 7; WP Work Opinion, supra note 276, at 6-7.
297 Balkin, supra note 281, at 1205.
298 Cf. Smith & Lee, supra note 282, at 635 (arguing that fiduciary duty should 
“distinguish the appropriate pursuit of self-interest from the inappropriate pursuit of 
self-interest” (emphasis in original)).
299 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (“An agent has a 
fiduciary duty to act loyally for the principal's benefit in all matters connected with 
the agency relationship.”); Balkin, supra note 281, at 1186 (fiduciaries should “act in 
ways that do not harm the interests” of those to who they owe fiduciary duties). Neil 
Richards and Woodrow Hartzog develop the concept of loyalty into a robust theory 
for data management. See Richards & Hartzog, supra note 287, at 6 (offering a 
theory “based on the risks of opportunism that arise when people trust others with 
their personal information and online experiences”).
300 See, e.g., Andrew Frazier, The Employee’s Contractual Duty of Fidelity, 131 L.Q.
REV. 53, 54 (2015) (discussing opportunities for employee opportunism).
301 See Part II.B. supra.
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A third avenue for better managing employee data would be bringing 
employees into the decision-making processes of collecting and using the 
data. Under current law, employees without union representation lack legal 
mechanisms for participating in decision-making about how the employer 
actually uses their data. Business organizational law has been remarkably 
successful in separating employment from ownership.302 Employees hand 
over their labor, good will, and personal capital to the firm, but then the 
firm—established as a corporation, partnership, or LLC—directs those assets 
to the ultimate benefit of the organization’s voting public, who are generally 
equity investors.303 The end result is that all other stakeholders, including 
employees, are fenced out from participation in governance.304
Unions have the power to negotiate on behalf of workers about terms 
and conditions of employment, which includes the collection and use of 
employee data.305 There is evidence that labor organizations are working with 
employers to manage the flow of information from employees, install 
appropriate protections for private data, and share the value created by the 
use of the data.306 Professional athletes in the four major U.S. sports leagues
302 See Dalia Tsuk, Corporations Without Labor: The Politics of Progressive 
Corporate Law, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1861, 1864 (2003) (exploring “how, in the course of 
the twentieth century, legal scholars and political theorists helped remove the 
interests of workers (as differentiated from shareholders, officers, and directors) 
from the core concerns of corporate law and theory”).
303 Honorable Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for A Clear-Eyed 
Understanding of the Power and Accountability Structure Established by the 
Delaware General Corporation Law, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761, 766 (2015) (“In the 
corporate republic, no constituency other than stockholders is given any power.”).
304 See Brett H. McDonnell, Employee Primacy, or Economics Meets Civic 
Republicanism at Work, 13 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 334, 335 (2008) (arguing instead for 
employee primacy in corporate decision-making).
305 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), 8(d) (providing for the duty to bargain in good faith).
Although data collection would generally fall into the terms and conditions 
category, data use could be considered part of the business operations and therefore 
left to the “core of entrepreneurial control.” See Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. 
NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 223 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
306 Lisa Kresge, Union Collective Bargaining Agreement Strategies in Response to 
Technology, Working Paper, Nov. 2020, https://laborcenter.berkeley.edu/wp-
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are all unionized and, as discussed earlier, have complex systems of 
information management as part of their collective bargaining agreements.307
For most employees, however, collective bargaining is not a viable option for 
information management.308 Just over one in ten employees is represented by 
a labor organization, and only 6.2% of private sector employees are 
unionized.309
No doubt the many roadblocks to collective bargaining should be 
lifted.310 But there are a plethora of potential organizational structures that 
could facilitate worker participation in actual governance, both as a general 
matter and specific to workplace data management. The system of corporate 
codetermination, required in many countries but most well-known in its 
German version, requires that employees at large companies choose fifty 
percent of the company’s supervisory board.311 Codetermination facilitates 
employee voice at the highest levels of power and would allow employees to 
push the board for better data relationships312 Recently two bills have 
content/uploads/2020/12/Working-Paper-Union-Collective-Bargaining-Agreement-
Strategies-in-Response-to-Technology.pdf. 
307 See Part III.C supra.
308 For a discussion of the causes of the low rate of unionization, see Cynthia L. 
Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527 (2002).
309 BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, UNION STATISTICS – 2020, Jan. 20, 2021, 
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf
310 See, e.g., Protecting the Right to Organize (“PRO”) Act, H.R. 2472, 116th Cong. § 
2(c) (2020). For a proposal to modernize the NLRA’s purpose of equal bargaining 
power through innovative social scientific analysis, see Hiba Hafiz, Structural Labor 
Rights, 119 MICH. L. REV. 651 (2021).
311 Katharina Pistor, Codetermination: A Sociopolitical Model with Governance 
Externalities, in EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 163, 174-75 (Margaret M. 
Blair & Mark J. Roe eds., 1999). The fifty-percent requirement applies to companies 
with more than 2000 employees. Companies with between 500 and 2000 employees 
must have 30% employee representation on the supervisory board. See Otto 
Sandrock & Jean J. du Plessis, The German System of Supervisory Codetermination 
by Employees, in GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN INTERNATIONAL AND 
EUROPEAN CONTEXT (Jean J. du Plessis et al. eds., 2012).
312 For a discussion of an American approach to employee governance participation, 
including codetermination, see GRANT M. HAYDEN & MATTHEW T. BODIE,
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proposed American versions of codetermination, making it less fanciful an 
idea than in the past.313
But codetermination is by no means the only model. Industries with 
high levels of worker data management could reorient their organizational 
structures to facilitate employee ownership. Gig workers, for example, could 
own the platforms upon which they work through a workers’ cooperative or 
nonprofit association.314 Others have suggested management-labor 
coordination models, such as a hiring hall.315 There are also internal 
governance mechanisms that facilitate employee involvement. With labels 
such as “self-managed,” “self-actualizing,” and “evolutionary,”316 new models 
of participatory management work within the organizational structure to give 
workers power over their workplace.317 Although these systems generally lie 
RECONSTRUCTING THE CORPORATION: FROM SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY TO SHARED 
GOVERNANCE 172-83 (2021).
313 The Accountable Capitalism Act, proposed by Senator (and former presidential 
candidate) Elizabeth Warren would require that companies with more than $1 
billion in average revenue have employees select at least 40% of the seats on the 
board. Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. (2018). Senator Tammy 
Baldwin has proposed the Reward Work Act, which proposes that one-third of 
directors be selected directly by employees. Reward Work Act, S. 2605, 115th Cong. 
(2018).
314 See Veena Dubal & Sushil Jacob, Escaping the Wage-Slave/Micro-Entrepreneur 
Binary: Platforms for Liberating Labor, J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV.
L., 2017, at 67 (proposing “an online marketplace that is owned and democratically 
governed by its members”); Ariana R. Levinson, Founding Worker Cooperatives: 
Social Movement Theory and the Law, 14 NEV. L.J. 322 (2014).
315 Cf. Sanjukta M. Paul, Uber As for-Profit Hiring Hall: A Price-Fixing Paradox and 
Its Implications, 38 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 233, 253 (2017) (suggesting that “the
difference between a hiring hall and Uber lies only in the distribution of the 
premium from price coordination that both engage in”).
316 See FREDERIC LALOUX, REINVENTING ORGANIZATIONS: A GUIDE TO CREATING 
ORGANIZATIONS INSPIRED BY THE NEXT STAGE OF HUMAN CONSCIOUSNESS 43 (2014) 
(using “self-actualizing,” “evolutionary,” “integral,” and “teal”); Ethan Bernstein et al., 
Beyond the Holacracy Hype, HARV. BUS. REV. 38, 40 (July–Aug. 2016) (using “self-
managed” and “flat”).
317 One particular instantiation of this broader movement is a system known as 
“holacracy.” See, e.g., BRIAN J. ROBERTSON, HOLACRACY: THE NEW MANAGEMENT 
SYSTEM FOR A RAPIDLY CHANGING WORLD (2015). 
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outside formal legal structures, law could incentivize their adoption and 
remove existing barriers to their work.318 We could also require works 
councils—firm-level or worksite-level organizations that consult with 
management on issues of day-to-day employment.319 These councils have had 
significant success in managing workplace issues in Germany and other 
European countries.320
A wrinkle on the works council more specific to the issue of workplace 
data would be a “data council.” The law could require employers to 
implement a committee of workers and management to review and approve 
any collection or use of employee data. Data councils could also be tasked 
with creating an “employee data privacy policy,” which—like consumer data 
privacy policies—could render the employer liable in the event that the 
policy was violated.321 Creation of a data council and deference to its 
determinations could alternatively act as a safe harbor against employee 
claims of privacy intrusion and data confiscation.322
Each of these different proposals has its own strengths and weaknesses, 
its own scope and parameters. The important thread running through them is 
the ability of workers to participate collectively in the management of their 
collective data. The economic firm and its legal instantiations are meant to 
facilitate the process of joint production. In the process, they have facilitated 
the capture of employee data. Workers need to assert collective power to 
protect their private data, insure that they receive the benefits of that data, 
and carve out spaces for entrepreneurial opportunities and autonomy.
318 There is some concern that the NLRA’s prohibition on company unions might 
prohibit certain forms of employee participation in the absence of a union. Matthew 
T. Bodie, Holacracy and the Law, 42 DEL. J. CORP. L. 619, 662-71 (2018).
319 Stephen F. Befort, A New Voice for the Workplace: A Proposal for an American 
Works Councils Act, 69 MO. L. REV. 607 (2004).
320 Id. at 609-10.
321 Violations of the policy could be considered breach of contract or a deceptive 
practice akin to those regulated by the Federal Trade Commission under § 5 of the 
FTC Act. Cf. 15 U.S.C. § 45.
322 Tech companies are now exploring the use of oversight boards to manage 
constituency concerns and provide for more democratic resolutions. See Kate 
Klonick, The Facebook Oversight Board: Creating an Independent Institution to 
Adjudicate Online Free Expression, 129 YALE L.J. 2418 (2020).
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CONCLUSION
The novel coronavirus pandemic provides a stark example of the need 
to reexamine the regulation of workplace data. In the absence of an OSHA 
regulatory response,323 businesses struggled to find the appropriate response 
to questions about when to reopen, appropriate safety measures, and the 
degree of risk that is acceptable for workers to shoulder. Workers have been
asked to share their temperatures, health conditions, and test results with 
their employers to prevent spread of the disease.324 Contact tracing apps 
follow employees at work and at home to monitor their interactions.325 If 
employers put these information-sharing burdens on employees without 
providing for their participation, these policies will exacerbate employees’ 
feelings of powerlessness, alienation, and violation. Participation, on the other 
hand, will provide workers with the opportunity to balance their privacy 
interests against concerns about contagion and infection. Employers and 
employees need not have oppositional interests here, but workers can be 
justifiably suspicious.326 Participation can counteract actual and imagined 
employer opportunism.
323 OSHA has provided only permissive guidance. OSHA, Protecting Workers: 
Guidance on Mitigating and Preventing the Spread of COVID-19 in the Workplace, 
https://www.osha.gov/coronavirus/safework (last visited Feb. 21, 2021).
324 Natasha Singer, Employers Rush to Adopt Virus Screening. The Tools May Not 
Help Much., N.Y. TIMES (May 11, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/11/technology/coronavirus-worker-testing-
privacy.html.
325 Kif Leswing, As Workplaces Slowly Reopen, Tech Companies Smell a New 
Multibillion-Dollar Opportunity: Helping Businesses Trace Coronavirus, CNBC.COM
(May 10, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/10/coronavirus-tracing-for-workplaces-
could-become-new-tech-opportunity.html.
326 Nicole Dungca, Jenn Abelson, Abha Bhattarai & Meryl Kornfield, On the Front 
Lines of the Pandemic, Grocery Workers are in the Dark about Risks, WASH. POST 
(May 24, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/2020/05/24/grocery-
workers-coronavirus-risks/
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The law relating to the collection and use of employee data needs a 
reconceptualization. The existing patchwork of privacy laws provides
uncertain relief, and intellectual property laws largely hand ownership over
the firm. The law has encased employer power over employee data through 
these limited privacy protections and expanding intellectual property 
allotments.327 We need a system that will recognize ongoing employee 
interests in their data, that will make employers accountable for their 
stewardship of this data, and that will give workers power and control over 
this information within the firm. By recognizing worker data rights in a 
variety of contexts and forms, we can empower employees within their 
workplaces and ameliorate the dehumanizing disconnections of modern 
labor.
327 See Kapczynski, supra note 265, at 1508-14 (discussing how law encases the power 
of information capitalists).
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